



# Best Value Review of Specialist Crime Support

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## Final Report

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Best Value



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## GLOSSARY

<b>4Cs</b>	The statutory requirement of the Best Value process that involves challenging, comparing, consulting and competing.
<b>BCU</b>	Basic Command Unit
<b>BVR</b>	Best Value Review
<b>CAD</b>	Community Action Department
<b>CID</b>	Criminal Investigation Department
<b>CJD</b>	Criminal Justice Department
<b>CPCU</b>	Cheque & Payment Card Unit
<b>CPS</b>	Crown Prosecution Service
<b>CSD</b>	Community Safety Department
<b>DCU</b>	Divisional Case Unit
<b>DMT</b>	Divisional Management Team
<b>DSHU</b>	Dedicated Source Handling Unit
<b>FIO</b>	Field Intelligence Officer
<b>FIB</b>	Force Intelligence Bureau
<b>FLO</b>	Family Liaison Officer
<b>FSS</b>	Forensic Science Service
<b>FPIT</b>	Family Protection Investigation Team
<b>HMIC</b>	Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary
<b>HOLMES</b>	Home Office Large Major Enquiry System
<b>HR</b>	Human Resources
<b>IT</b>	Information Technology
<b>MIU</b>	Major Incident Unit
<b>NAFIS</b>	National Automated Fingerprint Information System
<b>NCRS</b>	National Crime Recording Standards
<b>NIM</b>	National Intelligence Model
<b>NMIS</b>	National Management Information System
<b>PITO</b>	Police Information Technology Organisation
<b>PNC</b>	Police National Computer
<b>POCA</b>	Proceeds of Crime Act
<b>PSU</b>	Policing Standards Unit
<b>RIPA</b>	Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
<b>SB</b>	Special Branch
<b>SCS</b>	Specialist Crime Services
<b>SOCO</b>	Scenes of Crime Officer
<b>SIO</b>	Senior Investigating Officer
<b>SPU</b>	Sensitive Policing Unit

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 This review of Specialist Crime Support has been conducted during 2003-04 and forms a part of the year-four programme of Best Value Reviews of Bedfordshire Police. The review has been undertaken using the standard seven-stage methodology adopted by the Police Authority and the Force.
- 1.2 The objective of the Best Value Review of Specialist Crime Support was to examine a range of specialist policing functions and to consider how well these functions support the delivery of frontline policing services. In particular, the review sought to identify opportunities to make improvements in those areas where performance or capacity was viewed as weak.
- 1.3 All of the specialist policing functions examined under this review form part of the Specialist Crime Services Division, referred to throughout this report as Q Division. In some instances Q Division is directly responsible for the delivery of services, whereas in other cases Q Division co-ordinates service provision on behalf of the whole Force. Q Division has an establishment of 135 police officer posts and 132 police staff posts and for 2004/05 the Division has a budget of £10.68 millions.
- 1.4 The following specialist crime support functions were selected by the Police Authority for examination by the review:
- Major Incident Unit (staffing cost of £107k);
  - Drug Squad (staffing cost of £729k);
  - Fraud Squad (staffing cost of £354k);
  - Scientific Services (staffing cost of £1,742k);
  - Force Intelligence Bureau (staffing cost of £864k);
  - Criminal Justice Department (staffing cost of £102k);
  - Firearm Licensing; (staffing costs included in FIB structure);
  - Community Action Department (staffing cost of £429k);
  - Child Protection (staffing cost of £932k);
  - Coroner's Office (staffing cost of £120k);
  - Organisation & Management of Specialist Crime Services (staffing cost of £236k).

## **METHODOLOGY**

- 1.5 The review was undertaken using the Police Authority's agreed seven-stage best value review methodology and involved application of the 4Cs approach (challenge, compare, consult, compete). Given that the services being reviewed are all delivered in support of frontline policing, specific emphasis was given to the internal consultation process.

## **SUMMARY CONCLUSION**

- 1.6 Bedfordshire Police is responsible for delivering a very broad range of policing services. An ongoing challenge for the Force is to strike the right balance in the level of resources it commits to these different areas of activity. This review has identified a number of instances where specialist policing functions are currently under-resourced and consequently are having a detrimental impact on the overall effectiveness of the Force. The key areas where improvements need to be made are:

- the support given to major incident investigations;
- the capability to deal with serious and cross-border crime issues;
- the forensic examination of crime scenes;
- the investigation of volume fraud offences.

## **SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **Major Incident Unit**

#### **Overview**


- 1.7 The Major Incident Unit (MIU) is a small team of three people responsible for co-ordinating the deployment of staff to incident rooms and for delivering HOLMES training. The MIU also co-ordinates the work of Family Liaison Officers (FLOs) and is responsible for the operation of the HOLMES Casualty Bureau. The MIU staffing costs are £107k p.a.

#### **Key Findings**

- 1.8 The Force has no standing unit responsible for the investigation of major incidents and so resources these inquiries by temporarily abstracting staff away from their core roles to undertake incident room and investigative roles.

1.9 The abstraction of staff for major incident investigations has a detrimental impact on the performance of both frontline and specialist policing functions and the length of time staff are abstracted can be significant. For example, figures for Central Division show that CID officers were abstracted for an average of 110 working days each during 2002.

1.10 Relative to the officer strength of the Force, Bedfordshire has a high number of major incidents. This is illustrated by the graph below, which shows that Bedfordshire had comparatively few officers available to respond to the volume of major incidents experienced between 1991 and 2001.



1.11 Comparisons made with other police forces showed that they adopt a wide variety of structural and staffing arrangements to deal with major incidents. For example, Leicestershire Constabulary has a standing HOLMES Team comprising 20 staff and a Major Crime Team comprising 37 detectives, whereas Warwickshire Police has a HOLMES Team consisting of four staff and no major incident team.

1.12 The internal consultation and challenge processes revealed that managers and staff accept that, whatever the structural arrangement for dealing with major incidents, there will always be some need to abstract staff away from their core roles. This is a problem common to all police forces. For example, Leicestershire Constabulary had a CID abstraction rate of 40% during 2002/03 despite having a standing major incident team.

- 1.13 Internal consultation highlighted that maintaining continuity in the disclosure and exhibits functions is a critically important part of major incident investigations and, as a result, staff abstracted to perform these roles are normally engaged on incidents for long periods of time. Examples were quoted of staff having spent almost two years away from their core roles performing these duties.
- 1.14 Between 1997 and 2002, Bedfordshire dealt with 55 major incident investigations: 3 Category A; 22 Category B; and 30 Category C (see section 5.3 for definitions). Managers and staff view such incidents as a core policing function and support the notion of introducing a permanent staffing capacity in this area.
- 1.15 The challenge process revealed that the ideal solution for the Force would be to introduce a Major Incident Team that had both an incident room capacity and an inquiry team capacity. However, consultation with service experts revealed that Bedfordshire is too small to justify the level of resource investment needed to sustain such an arrangement but that the Force could sustain a smaller team comprising of HOLMES Indexers.
- 1.16 Analysis of major incident room staffing levels has shown that the Force could employ a small team of HOLMES Indexers on a permanent basis. This solution would release police officers back to their core roles and would generate a significant net non-cashable efficiency saving. Forces such as Cambridgeshire, Northamptonshire and Hertfordshire have all adopted this approach.
- 1.17 Professional judgement suggests that in order to obtain best value from a HOLMES Indexer Team, staff need to be kept fully deployed at all times. If any major incident downtime occurs then could be utilised to undertake such duties as Casualty Bureau Training or assisting in cold-case reviews.
- 1.18 One consequence of the high level of major incidents experienced by the Force during the last two to three years has been that the MIU has had insufficient capacity to fully develop the Casualty Bureau and Family Liaison functions.

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

- 1.19 It is the conclusion of this review that there would be significant operational benefits to be derived from creating a team of permanent HOLMES Indexers.

### Recommendation 1

**The Force should create a permanent HOLMES team capacity to support the investigation of major incidents by appointing ten police staff HOLMES Indexers.**

#### **Financial Implications, Savings, Benefits and Monitoring**

- 1.20 Budget growth will be required for **recommendation one** in order to fund the appointment of ten police staff posts. It is estimated that this development will cost **c. £184k p.a.** The direct impact of this recommendation will be to release police officers back to frontline duties. It is estimated that the value of police resources released will be **c. £348k p.a.**, thereby generating a net non-cashable efficiency saving for the Force of **c. £164k p.a.**
- 1.21 Other business benefits to be derived from **recommendation one** will include: a reduction in the time taken to initially set up HOLMES incident rooms; an improved ability to manage the deployment of trained staff between different incidents; a reduction in the need to train police officers in HOLMES roles; and an increased capacity to deliver casualty bureau requirements.
- 1.22 An integral part of the Force's best value methodology is a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) monitoring process which tracks the progress of implementation of agreed recommendations and assesses the extent to which expected and anticipated benefits are actually delivered. Results of this monitoring are regularly reported to the Police Authority.

#### **Progress Against the Recommendation**

- 1.23 It is published HMIC best practice for forces to 'fast-track' the implementation of recommendations where this would bring about a rapid improvement in service or address identified problem areas.
- 1.24 The recommendation to implement a permanent HOLMES indexer team was recognised as a priority issue at the 'emerging findings' stage of the review. Given that implementation required the establishment of new posts, a growth item was included in the 2004/05 budget proposals. The Police Authority gave approval for this funding in February 2004. These positions have now been advertised and the intention is to appoint people into post commencing in September 2004.

## **Issues for Local Management Action**

1.25 The Q Division Management Team should:

- (i) identify a post holder to act as a second Family Liaison Officer Co-ordinator and ensure that both Family Liaison Officer Co-ordinators undertake a suitable FLO training course;
- (ii) ensure that the Head of the MIU and one other nominated post-holder undertake the Casualty Bureau training course;
- (iii) ensure that, prior to the end of the 2004/05 financial year, an exercise to test the Force's Casualty Bureau plan is conducted;
- (iv) should develop a business case setting out the costs and benefits for establishing permanent Disclosure/Exhibits Officer posts to support major incident investigations (these posts could be police officer or police staff roles).

## **Drug Squad and Surveillance Capability**

### **Overview**

1.26 The Force Drug Squad is a team of skilled and experienced detectives who target criminals involved in the supply of class 'A' drugs; support the investigation of major incidents; and provide the main surveillance capability for the Force. The Squad is headed by a Detective Inspector and comprises two Detective Sergeants, 16 Detective Constables and one Police Staff administrator. The staffing costs for the Squad is £729k p.a.

### **Key Findings**

1.27 The skills and capabilities possessed by officers of the Drug Squad are very much in demand within the Force. However, the Squad lacks the resources to adequately meet all of these demands. For example, with 11 officers needed to mount a mobile surveillance operation, the current resource level of the Squad make it extremely difficult to sustain surveillance over any length of time. This lack of capacity is hindering operational effectiveness.

1.28 The high level of major incidents experienced over the last two to three years has meant that the Squad has suffered from a high abstraction rate. As a result, only a very limited capacity has been available to tackle drug supply offences. Internal consultation suggested that this has resulted in a situation where the Force “has a Drug Squad in name only”.

1.29 The lack of surveillance capability in the Force has been identified as a specific weakness by the HMIC during the recent BCU inspections of Luton and North Bedfordshire Divisions. The specific comments made were as follows:

Luton BCU Inspection Report (May 2002) – *‘As the BCU (and the Force) become more proficient with the NIM, the need for surveillance will increase and it is suggested that the Force considers re-introducing a dedicated surveillance capacity.*

North Bedfordshire BCU Inspection Report (March 2003) – *‘It is recommended that the Force review the systems and level of resources available at HQ to support BCUs in tackling levels 1 and 2 criminality. The review should focus on the availability of a proactive and a mobile surveillance capability.’*

1.30 The challenge process revealed that the surveillance capability issue is part of a broader problem in terms of a weakness in tackling NIM Level 2 criminality. The view expressed was that the Force has invested resources in the front-end of its intelligence process (e.g. information gathering and analysis) but now needs to invest in creating the operational capacity needed to respond to identified problems (e.g. field intelligence and surveillance).

1.31 An examination of the Force’s progress in implementing NIM, conducted by the ACPO NIM Project Team in November 2003, also commented on the Force’s lack of Level 2 capability. Research undertaken by ACPO in developing the NIM 2003 National Strategic Assessment has identified that a lack of NIM Level 2 capability is a problem common to many Forces in England and Wales. Weakness in this area has arisen due to increased workload demands (in areas such as organised crime and people trafficking) combined with a national shortage of experienced detectives.

1.32 Comparisons made with other forces showed that each force tailors its NIM Level 2 capability to fit its local needs. In a survey of 12 forces across the south and east, four forces had Drug Squads, five had dedicated surveillance teams and three had no standing team operating at the centre, having established a proactive capability on each BCU.

- 1.33 Warwickshire Police has a surveillance unit comprising of 15 detectives and also contributes to a regional drug squad. Leicestershire Constabulary has a special operations unit comprising of 34 detectives, which provides a flexible Level 2 capability (surveillance, drugs and gun crime).
- 1.34 The challenge process revealed that for a Force the size of Bedfordshire, the most practicable solution in responding to NIM Level 2 criminality is to retain a mobile surveillance capability at the centre and to continue the current approach of combining this function with other operational duties. These other duties would include a responsibility in relation to drug dealing, serious criminality and assisting in major incident investigations.
- 1.35 Professional judgement suggests that in order to overcome its weakness in responding to NIM Level 2 criminality, the resources of the Drug Squad need to be increased. This need to increase resource levels is particularly acute if the Squad is to continue to be used to support major incident investigations. Similarly, increased capacity is needed if the Force is going to have the ability to deal with the increased surveillance requirements it is anticipated the NIM will generate at both Level 1 and Level 2.

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

- 1.36 The Review has concluded that the centrally based, multi-functional role of the Drugs Squad is the right approach for Bedfordshire Police and should be retained. However, it is considered that the resources of the Drug Squad need to be increased in order to meet the growing demand for surveillance and to provide a degree of operational resilience.
- 1.37 The Review has also concluded that the operating priorities of the Drug Squad should be set through the Force Tactical Tasking and Co-ordinating Group and should encompass all forms of NIM Level 2 criminality and not just drug dealing. As such, the Squad should be re-titled to reflect its broader remit.

<b>Recommendation 2</b>
<b>The Force should retain its current approach of operating with a centrally based team of specialist officers performing a multi-functional role in relation to drug-related crime, surveillance and major incident investigations. However, the Drug Squad should be re-titled as the Drug and Serious Crime Group to better reflect its role in dealing with NIM Level 2 criminality.</b>

### Recommendation 3

**The Force should expand the operational capacity of the Drug and Serious Crime Group by increasing the number of constable posts by nine, thereby giving 25 centrally-based operational constable posts in total**

**(Note:** these additional posts would be provided from police posts released as a result of the Force's 2004/05 civilianisation programme and not through police establishment growth).

### Financial Implications, Savings, Benefits and Monitoring

- 1.38 **Recommendation two** has no direct cost implications for the organisation. The main business benefits to be derived from **recommendation two** include: retaining the most pragmatic and sustainable approach to service provision for a force the size of Bedfordshire; an improved corporate approach by aligning the work of the unit with the priorities of the NIM Level 2 Control Strategy; improved transparency over deployment decisions with tasking undertaken by the Force Tasking and Tactical Co-ordination Group.
- 1.39 In relation to **recommendation three**, it is proposed that the nine additional constable posts for the Drug and Serious Crime Group are provided from police posts released as a result of the Force's 2004/05 civilianisation programme and not through police establishment growth. As such, this recommendation has no additional direct cost implications for the organisation. However, the **opportunity cost** of these nine posts equates to **£324k p.a.**, i.e. although not establishment growth, these police posts could have been utilised for other frontline policing roles.
- 1.40 The main business benefits to be derived from **recommendation three** include: increased operations and against drug suppliers; an increased surveillance capability to support intelligence-led policing; improved tactical options to deal with NIM Level 2 criminality; and a reduced need to abstract other detectives to support major incident investigations.
- 1.41 Increasing the resources of the Drug and Serious Crime Group will increase its capacity by some 56%. This increased capacity provides the opportunity for **potential future efficiency gains estimated at £410k p.a.**
- 1.42 An integral part of the Force's best value methodology is a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) monitoring process which tracks the progress of implementation of agreed recommendations and assesses the extent to which expected and anticipated benefits are actually delivered. Results of this monitoring are regularly reported to the Police Authority.

## **Progress Against the Recommendations**

- 1.43 It is published HMIC best practice for forces to 'fast-track' the implementation of recommendations where this would bring about a rapid improvement in service or address identified problem areas.
- 1.44 In February 2004, the Police Authority approved the 2004/05 budget, which included a £730k civilianisation programme designed to release 34 police officer posts for allocation to other duties. The nine additional constable posts required by this recommendation have been identified as priority posts to be filled as a result of this civilianisation.
- 1.45 The nine posts have now been advertised in-Force with selection due to take place during June 2004. Once successful candidates have been appointed the release of officers from their existing posts to take up these new roles will be carefully managed so as to minimise the impact on other parts of the organisation and to fit with the civilianisation process.

## **Issues for Local Management Action**

- 1.46 The Q Division Management Team should:
- (i) develop a protocol to show how the resources of the Drug and Serious Crime Group will be used as investigators to support various categories of major incidents;
  - (ii) develop a process to utilise the specialist skills of the Drug and Serious Crime Group in liaising with and supporting officers on territorial divisions in dealing with drug offences, this might include introducing Drug Liaison Officers;
  - (iii) transfer the line management responsibility for the Technical Support Unit from the Force Intelligence Bureau and incorporated within the management structure of the Drug and Serious Crime Group;
  - (iv) examine the potential benefits of civilianising the Chemist Inspection Officer post and of incorporating that function within the Community Action Department, working alongside the Force Drugs Co-ordinator.

## **Fraud Squad**

### **Overview**

1.47 The Fraud Squad is headed by a Detective Sergeant and has seven detective constable posts and four police staff posts (the Squad's staffing costs are £354k p.a.). Based at Luton Police Station, the Fraud Squad undertakes investigations into economic crimes in three main areas: cheque and payment card offences (performed by two detective constables and two police staff); financial investigation (performed by three detective constables and two police staff); and complex fraud investigation (performed by two detective constables).

### **Key Findings**

1.48 Fraud does not feature as a priority crime area in the Home Office National Policing Plan and so forces have a degree of freedom of the level of resources they commit to activities in this area. For example, Warwickshire Police has a Fraud Squad consisting of eight detectives and two police staff whereas Leicestershire Constabulary has an Economic Crime Unit comprising 15 detectives and 6 police staff.

1.49 The Force maintains only a very limited capacity to investigate serious and complex frauds with this responsibility allocated to two detective constable posts. However, providing this limited level of service has proved difficult due to major incident abstractions and staff transfers to other forces. In an effort to overcome this difficulty, the Squad has successfully experimented with buying-in services from the private sector.

1.50 Cheque and payment card offences represent the vast majority of economic crimes and offences are growing at a significant rate. Such offences cost the UK economy £425 million during 2002. Bedfordshire recorded over 1,900 cheque and credit card offences during 2002/03. Tackling these volume fraud offences has the potential to generate a significant number of detections for the Force.

1.51 Internal consultation showed strong support for the view that the role of the Cheque and Payment Card Unit (CPCU) should include both intelligence package preparation and offender handling, i.e. that the whole service should be provided in-house within the CPCU.

- 1.52 The findings of the Review endorse an expanded role for the CPCU as this approach would remove workload from frontline officers, enable the Force to maximise the use of intelligence and generate an increased number of crime detections. However, the resources of the CPCU would need to be substantially increased to enable it to take on this additional workload.
- 1.53 The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) provides powers to recover assets/monies acquired through any form of criminal activity (with monies recovered going into a central national fund with the future potential for some proportion of the recovered monies coming back to the Force. This new legislation has the potential to be a very powerful tool with which to target criminals, disrupt activity and reduce crime.
- 1.54 In order to maximise the potential benefits of POCA, the Force needs to develop its financial investigation capacity in two areas:
- a reactive capability to directly support frontline officers in maximising opportunities for recovering assets/monies from offenders brought before the courts;
  - a proactive capability that is driven by NIM priorities to target high profile and prolific offenders.
- 1.55 Although the Force currently has five Financial Investigator posts, workload in this area is increasing significantly. For example, the Force conducted 206 financial investigations in 2002/03 compared to just 135 during 2001/02, an increase of 53%. It is fully anticipated that the advent of POCA will increase the workload further and require a future increase in resources. Looking to the future, the Force should seek to develop a business case for introducing a financial investigation capacity on each of the territorial divisions.

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

- 1.56 This Review has concluded that the priorities of the Fraud Squad should be orientated to more directly support frontline policing performance. This would entail more focus on volume cheque and payment card offences and increased use of 'reactive' POCA powers focused on asset confiscation. By comparison, the investigation of complex fraud offences and 'proactive' financial investigations would attract a lower level of priority.

#### Recommendation 4

**The Cheque and Plastic Card Unit should undertake both an intelligence gathering and offender-handling role. In order to provide this extended level of service, the resources of the Unit should be increased by four constable posts**

**(Note:** these additional posts would be provided from police posts released as a result of the Force's 2004/05 civilianisation programme and not through police establishment growth).

#### Recommendation 5

**The Force should re-focus its financial investigation processes to give more emphasis to reactive investigations arising from arrests/convictions and so maximise opportunities presented by the Proceeds of Crime Act.**

### Financial Implications, Savings, Benefits and Monitoring

- 1.57 In relation to **recommendation four**, it is proposed that the four additional constable posts for the Cheque and Plastic Card Unit are provided from police posts released as a result of the Force's 2004/05 civilianisation programme and not through police establishment growth). As such, this recommendation has no additional direct cost implications for the organisation. However, the **opportunity cost** of these four posts equates to **£144k p.a.**, i.e. although not establishment growth, these police posts could have been utilised for other frontline policing roles.
- 1.58 The main business benefits to be derived from **recommendation four** will include: an increase in the number of cheque and plastic card offences detected; improvements in the quality of intelligence generated regarding organised credit card fraud; and a removal of workload from officers on territorial divisions because the CPCU will provide a complete in-house service.
- 1.59 Increasing the resources of the Cheque and Plastic Unit will increase its capacity of the Fraud Squad of by some 40%. This increased capacity provides the opportunity for **potential future efficiency gains estimated at £135k p.a.**
- 1.60 In relation to **recommendation five**, this involves a re-focus of existing financial investigation resources and, as such, this development has no additional direct cost to the organisation.

- 1.61 The main business benefits to be derived from **recommendation five** will include: an increase in the number of reactive financial investigations undertaken; an increase in the use of POCA powers; and an increase in the amount of monies seized through asset confiscation orders.
- 1.62 An integral part of the Force's best value methodology is a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) monitoring process which tracks the progress of implementation of agreed recommendations and assesses the extent to which expected and anticipated benefits are actually delivered. Results of this monitoring are regularly reported to the Police Authority.

### **Progress Against the Recommendation**

- 1.63 It is published HMIC best practice for forces to 'fast-track' the implementation of recommendations where this would bring about a rapid improvement in service or address identified problem areas.
- 1.64 In February 2004, the Police Authority approved the 2004/05 budget, which included a £730k civilianisation programme designed to release 34 police officer posts for allocation to other duties. The four additional constable posts required by **recommendation four** have been identified as priority posts to be filled as a result of this civilianisation.
- 1.65 These four posts have recently been advertised with applications invited by the end of June 2004. Once successful candidates have been identified, the release of officers from their existing posts to take up these new roles will be carefully managed so as to minimise the impact on other parts of the organisation and to fit with the civilianisation process.

### **Issues for Local Management Action**

- 1.66 The Q Division Management Team should:
- (i) re-title the Fraud Squad as the Economic Crime Unit in order to better reflect its full range of responsibilities and to emphasise the increased focus on cheque and plastic card offences, and the application of POCA powers;
  - (ii) make suitable budgetary provision for buying-in specialist fraud investigation skills to cover the period until the Force has a full establishment of trained fraud investigators;

- (iii) develop a business case setting out the costs and benefits of expanding the Force's financial investigation capacity so as to potentially provide a suitably trained member of staff (police officer or police staff) in the Intelligence Unit on each of the territorial Divisions.

## **Scientific Services Department**

### **Overview**

- 1.67 The role of the Scientific Services Department is to apply forensic processes and techniques in order to secure identification and elimination evidence to support the investigation of crime. The Department is centrally managed but locally based with an operating unit on each of the territorial divisions.
- 1.68 The staffing costs for the Scientific Services Department is £1,742k p.a. The Department is headed by a senior police staff manager and has three main sections:
- Scenes of Crime and Forensic Submissions (with a total of 39 members of staff);
  - Fingerprint Bureau (with a total of 15 members of staff);
  - Imagery Section (with a total of 7 members of staff).

### **Key Findings**

- 1.69 Frontline staff view Scientific Services as the most important services provided by Q Division. There was very strong consensus across all part of the organisation that the Force needed to continue to invest resources in developing is forensic capability. Forensic science techniques currently generate 14% of the Force's total number of crime detections.
- 1.70 The Force currently received funding for 11 posts under the DNA Expansion Fund. If this funding to be withdrawn in the future then either service levels would have to be significantly reduced or the Police Authority would need increase funding by around £280k p.a.
- 1.71 The Fingerprint Bureau is consistently ranked as one of the top five best performing in England and Wales in terms of how effectively it utilises the National Automated Fingerprint Identification System. The Bureau has successfully applied for ISO9001 accreditation.

1.72 Prior to the commencement of this review, the Force had already commissioned an independent appraisal of the operation of the Scientific Services Department. This project was carried out in conjunction with the Home Office Policing Standards Unit with the review conducted by an expert from the Forensic Science Service.

1.73 This Policing Standards Unit review was an in-depth examination of practices and procedures and generated some 25 detailed recommendations. These covered the following areas:

- Increasing crime scene attendance by increasing the number of SOCOs;
- Developing improved tasking procedures for SOCOs;
- Improving systems for performance management across the Department;
- Streamlining and improving the systems for laboratory submissions.

1.74 Building on the outcomes from the Policing Standards Unit review, the Scientific Services Department is part way through implementing a major change programme which has included the civilianisation of SOCO posts, new arrangements for DNA submissions, accommodation changes and skills development for staff. The Force has already identified that further work still needs to be done in terms of improving performance, especially in terms of converting DNA and fingerprint identifications into detections.

1.75 In progressing one of the Policing Standards Unit review recommendations, the Q Division DMT commissioned the Force's Business Management Department to undertake an examination of SOCO demands and shift patterns. Completed in May 2003, this review identified that in order to operate a shift pattern that reasonably reflects SOCO workload demand, the Force needed to increase the number of SOCO posts from 24 to 28.

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

1.76 This review has concluded that effective operation of the Scientific Services Department is a critical aspect of the Force's overall aim to improve frontline performance, particularly in relation to volume crime offences. The critical nature of these services has already been recognised by the Force and efforts are ongoing to improve performance. However, this review has concluded that the Force still needs to do more in this area, most especially in terms of increasing its SOCO capacity.

## Recommendation 6

**The Force should further develop its forensic science capability by increasing the number of SOCO posts from the current level of 24 up to 28 posts.**

### Financial Implications, Savings, Benefits and Monitoring

- 1.77 Budget growth will be required for **recommendation six** in order to fund the appointment of four additional police staff Scenes of Crime Officers. It is estimated that this development will cost **c. £89k p.a.**
- 1.78 The main business benefits to be derived from **recommendation six** will include: an improved level of service provided to victims of crime; an increase in the number of crime scenes attended; an increase in the number of forensic identifications; an increase in the number of crimes detected; and improved frontline policing performance.
- 1.79 Increasing the number of Scenes of Crime Officers will increase its capacity of the Scientific Services Department by around 16%. This increased capacity provides the opportunity for **potential future efficiency gains estimated at £290k p.a.**
- 1.80 An integral part of the Force's best value methodology is a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) monitoring process which tracks the progress of implementation of agreed recommendations and assesses the extent to which expected and anticipated benefits are actually delivered. Results of this monitoring are regularly reported to the Police Authority.

### Progress Against the Recommendation

- 1.81 It is published HMIC best practice for forces to 'fast-track' the implementation of recommendations where this would bring about a rapid improvement in service or address identified problem areas.
- 1.82 The recommendation to increase the number of frontline SOCO posts was recognised as a priority issue at the 'emerging findings' stage of the review. Given that implementation required the establishment of new posts, a growth item was included in the 2004/05 budget proposals. The Police Authority gave approval for this funding in February 2004. Selection for these posts is now completed with staff commencing in post in July 2004.

## **Issues for Local Management Action**

- 1.83 The Q Division Management Team should introduce a service level agreement between the Scientific Services Department and territorial divisions that, within an overall corporate framework, would enable forensic science services to be tailored to reflect the NIM Control Strategy priorities of each division.

## **Force Intelligence Bureau**

### **Overview**

- 1.84 The Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB) is based at Force Headquarters and is responsible for providing a wide range of specialist intelligence and analysis functions designed to support operational policing; provide co-ordination and information sharing across the Force; and manage the exchange of intelligence with other police organisations nationally and internationally.
- 1.85 The FIB has four operating units: the Intelligence Development Unit; Intelligence Analysis Unit; Sensitive Policing Unit; and Firearms Licensing Section (which has been reviewed as a separate functional area). In total, the FIB has 14 Police Officer posts and 12 Police Staff posts which collectively cost £864k p.a.

### **Key Findings**

- 1.86 The Force is working towards full implementation of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) by April 2004. The FIB plays a central role in the operation of the NIM, especially in terms of developing and assessing issues at NIM Level 2 (i.e. cross-border and serious crime issues).
- 1.87 The Force had developed a NIM Level 2 Control Strategy that has five key priority areas: domestic burglary; violent crime; vehicle crime; repetitious demand; and drug supply. This Control Strategy will drive the work of the FIB and other resources involved in NIM Level 2 operations. Other NIM processes are developing and maturing, in particular the process to tasking and co-ordinating activities.
- 1.88 Although the Force has invested a significant amount of resource force-wide in developing its approach to NIM, the challenge process revealed that the organisation currently lacks the ability to adopt and sustain a robust approach to dealing with Level 2 criminality.

- 1.89 The Force has received adverse comment about its lack of Level 2 capability in two HMIC BCU inspections and also in a recent progress review of NIM implementation conducted by the National ACPO NIM Project Team.
- 1.90 Service experts expressed the view that the key area of weakness in the FIB is the lack of Field Intelligence Officer (FIO) capacity to develop and research intelligence packages on Level 2 crimes and target criminals. Currently the FIB only has three FIOs and has also experienced a high level of abstraction of these officers to support major incidents.
- 1.91 The professional judgement expressed by service experts during the consultation exercise suggests that, in order for the Force to effectively implement its NIM Level 2 Control Strategy, it must be able to develop and maintain up-to-date intelligence on key crimes and key targets. This needs to be supported by processes to assess, prioritise, task and action intelligence to produce real results.
- 1.92 The lack of sufficient Field Intelligence Officer capacity creates a very real weakness in the intelligence chain because it limits the ability to research and evaluate different options and tactics. This feeds through to the tasking process and eventually undermines the quality of decision-making over how best to deploy limited resources. Given the complex and serious nature of Level 2 criminality, this weakness needs to be remedied in order for NIM to be effective.

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

- 1.93 The Force is fully committed to NIM and the work of the FIB is crucial in making that approach effective. The organisation has already invested resources to create the capacity needed to make NIM work in terms of dealing with local crime issues (NIM Level 1). However, further investment is required to improve the way the Force deals with NIM Level 2 issues. In particular, the Force needs to increase its FIO capability in order to enable effective implementation of its NIM Level 2 Control Strategy.

<b>Recommendation 7</b>
<p><b>The Force should increase its capacity to deal with NIM Level 2 criminality by creating three additional constable Field Intelligence Officer posts in the Force Intelligence Bureau.</b></p> <p><b>(Note:</b> these additional posts would be provided from police posts released as a result of the Force's 2004/05 civilianisation programme and not through police establishment growth).</p>

## **Financial Implications, Savings, Benefits and Monitoring**

- 1.94 In relation to **recommendation seven**, it is proposed that the three additional detective constable posts for the Force Intelligence Bureau are provided from police posts released as a result of the Force's 2004/05 civilianisation programme and not through police establishment growth. As such, this recommendation has no additional direct cost implications for the organisation. However, the **opportunity cost** of these three posts equates to **£108k p.a.**, i.e. although not establishment growth, these police posts could have been utilised for other frontline policing roles.
- 1.95 The main business benefits to be derived from **recommendation seven** will include: an improved ability to maintain up-to-date intelligence profiles on priority crime areas and target criminals; an improved research capability to develop NIM Level 2 intelligence packages; improved decision-making for NIM Level 2 operations; more efficient deployment of specialist policing resources; and a more effective and sustainable approach to tackling serious crime.
- 1.96 Increasing the number of Field Intelligence Officers will increase the overall capacity of the Force Intelligence Bureau. However, given the nature of the work of the FIB it is not possible to assign a monetary value to the impact of this increased capacity.
- 1.97 An integral part of the Force's best value methodology is a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) monitoring process which tracks the progress of implementation of agreed recommendations and assesses the extent to which expected and anticipated benefits are actually delivered. Results of this monitoring are regularly reported to the Police Authority.

### **Progress Against the Recommendation**

- 1.98 It is published HMIC best practice for forces to 'fast-track' the implementation of recommendations where this would bring about a rapid improvement in service or address identified problem areas.
- 1.99 In February 2004, the Police Authority approved the 2004/05 budget, which included a £730k civilianisation programme designed to release 34 police officer posts for allocation to other duties. The three additional constable posts required by this recommendation have been identified as priority posts to be filled as a result of this civilianisation. These posts will be advertised in the near future with the intention to bring people into post in September 2004.

## **Issues for Local Management Action**

- 1.100 The Q Division Management Team should align the responsibilities in individual Field Intelligence Officers with the five priorities in the NIM Level 2 Control Strategy.

## **Criminal Justice Department**

### **Overview**

- 1.101 The Criminal Justice Department (CJD) provides a central point for liaison and policy development on all matters relating to the administration of justice. The CJD enjoys very close working relationships with the Divisional Case Units, which are managed as a part of the territorial divisional structure. The Department's staffing costs are £102k p.a.

### **Key Findings**

- 1.102 In February 2003, the Force Executive commissioned an internal management review of the Community Action Department, which included an examination of the functions and activities of the CJD.
- 1.103 The internal management review identified a lack of resilience in terms of the operation and staffing of the CJD. This was viewed as a critical weakness given the volume of national and local developments impacting on the criminal justice arena.
- 1.104 In October 2003, the Force Strategy Board approved proposals to civilianise a Police Inspector post and to create an Administration of Justice Manager post. It was also agreed to establish the CJD as a discrete department, reporting directly to the Head of Q Division.
- 1.105 Internal consultation undertaken for this review showed that the work of the CJD was highly rated, particularly in terms of supporting Division Case Units. In line with the findings of the internal management review, staff strongly supported the need to increase staffing levels and resilience in the CJD.
- 1.106 Frontline staff expressed the desire to see improved access to criminal justice related information in areas such as case law, relevant forms, legislation and guidance. It was felt that the Force Intranet could be used to provide this information.

1.107 Opportunities to standardise practices across criminal justice agencies were also highlighted. In particular, it was felt that all Courts in Bedfordshire should have the same technical capability to display CCTV and other relevant video evidence prepared in-force by Video Technicians. Ideally that capability should be for the display using DVD technology.

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

1.108 This review has concluded that the Force does need to increase its capacity to deal with developments in the criminal justice arena and endorses the findings on the internal management review. Actions arising from the internal management review are already being progressed and this review has identified no additional recommendations for change.

### **Issues for Local Management Action**

1.109 The Q Division Management Team should:

- (i) improve the access to criminal justice related information for operational officers (this should include exploring the feasibility of utilising the Force Intranet to create a one-stop-shop for all relevant information);
- (ii) Liaise with the Bedfordshire Local Criminal Justice Board (Criminal Justice Excellence Forum sub-group) to ensure a common format of DVD based video imagery display equipment is in operation at all Courts in the Force area.

### **Child Protection Team**

#### **Overview**

1.110 The role of the Child Protection Team (CPT) is to investigate all situations of ill treatment of children, including neglect and physical, sexual and emotional abuse. Partnership working is a core to the operation of the CPT and is pursued via the countywide Area Child Protection Committee and Adult Protection Committee. Headed by a Detective Inspector, the CPT operates with two geographical teams. In total, these 2 teams consist of 3 Detective Sergeants, 14 Detective Constables and 4 Police Staff posts (costing £932k p.a.).

1.111 The organisation of the Child Protection Team also incorporates a specific Serious Sexual Offences Team (SSOT) responsible for investigating sexual offences where the victim is an adult. This team comprises of one Detective Sergeant and four Detective Constables.

## **Key Findings**

- 1.112 The Inquiry report into the death of Victoria Climbié, published in January 2003, contained approximately 20 recommendations that had direct implications for the police service. The Force Executive commissioned an internal management review to assess the extent to which Bedfordshire Police complied with national best practice in terms of child protection and to develop an action plan to implement the relevant Climbié recommendations. The review and associated action plan were complete by April 2003.
- 1.113 One key outcome from this internal review was the decision to replace the existing Family Protection Investigation Team with a dedicated CPT. Implementation of this new structure took place during September 2003. Internal consultation showed a high degree of support for this change.
- 1.114 The SSOT structure was implemented in November 2003. Internal consultation revealed some concerns amongst Divisional Victim Liaison Officers (DVLOs) over the implications of this new arrangement for their roles. In particular, there was a desire to see improved support being provided from the centre.
- 1.115 Sections 16 and 17 of the Youth Justice & Criminal Evidence Act 1999 deal with the interviewing of, and giving of evidence by, vulnerable and intimidated victims and witnesses. Although this legislation has important implications for the work of the CPT (e.g. video interviewing facilities and training requirements) it was considered that this was primarily a policy issue that was outside of the scope of this review.

## **Conclusions and Recommendations**

- 1.116 This review has concluded that the introduction of the CPT will improve the level of service provided to victims and will help the Force to address issues identified in the Victoria Climbié Inquiry. As such, this approach represents the right way forward for the Force. Taking account of the fact that the CPT and SSOT changes were only implemented at the latter end of 2003, this review has identified no further recommendations for change.

## **Issues for Local Management Action**

- 1.117 The Q Division Management Team should conduct a post-implementation evaluation of the operation of the SSOT, including the impact on the role and workload of DVLOs. This evaluation should take place after the SSOT has been in operation for 12 months.

## **Community Action Department**

### **Overview**

- 1.118 The Community Action Department (CAD) performs a wide range of functions, all of which relate to the core themes of community cohesion (incorporating community safety, reassurance and diversity) and crime reduction. CAD is based at Saxon House in Kempston and is staffed by a Superintendent, three Police Inspectors, three Constables and four Police Staff posts (costing £429k p.a.)
- 1.119 The CAD is responsible for liaising with a range of statutory and non-statutory bodies and takes the policy lead for the Force on a range of issues including crime reduction, drugs action, reassurance, community and race relations, and income generation.
- 1.120 A key role of the CAD is to work in partnership with other agencies and organisations to address areas of common responsibility or common interest. This area of activity was excluded from the scope of this review as it will be examined as a part of the year four Best Value Review of Partnerships.

### **Key Findings**

- 1.121 In February 2003, the Force Executive commissioned an internal management review of the CAD. The primary finding of the internal management review was the need to re-focus the work of the CAD around the key strategic themes of community cohesion and crime reduction.
- 1.122 Internal consultation for this best value review was conducted while the internal management review was still ongoing. The findings from this best value review strongly echo those issues identified by the Q Division Management Team. In particular, the need to refocus effort around core themes and to clearly delineate between central and divisional responsibilities in terms of partnership working.

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

- 1.123 This review has concluded that proposals to refocus the work of the CAD around the key strategic themes of community cohesion and crime reduction is the right way forward for the Force and addresses the issues identified during internal consultation for this best value review.

- 1.124 Actions arising from the internal management review are already being progressed and this review has identified no additional recommendations for change and no additional management actions.

## **Coroner's Office Function**

### **Overview**

- 1.125 The role of the Coroner's Office is to represent the interests of Her Majesty's Coroner and Bedfordshire Police in the investigation of sudden, violent, suspicious or unnatural deaths. The Coroner's Office service is based in Luton and Bedford and is managed by a Police Sergeant who leads a team of four staff. Three of these staff members are Bedfordshire Police employees (funded by the County Council) and one is a County Council employee.

### **Key Findings**

- 1.126 Service standards for the Coroner's Office function have been in operation since 1997 and measure the time taken to complete legal documentation relating to the release of a body following a report to the Coroner. Performance exceeded all standards during 2002/03. The Coroner's Officers provide a 24-hour call-out system to support major incident investigations. This service is highly regarded by Senior Investigating Officers.
- 1.127 The results of a national review of the coroner's service were published in June 2003. One key recommendation made was to establish a National Coroners' Service. The Home Office is currently considering this proposal and, if adopted, implementation would not be until 2006 at the earliest.

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

- 1.128 This review has concluded that the Coroner's Office function operates effectively and provides a good level of service. This review has identified no recommendations for change in relation to the operation of the Coroner's Office function.

### **Issues for Local Management Action**

- 1.129 The Q Division Management Team should undertake an evaluation of the impact that the creation of a National Coroners Service would have on local service provision in Bedfordshire, including the impact on existing staff, staffing levels and service costs.

## **Firearms Licensing Section**

### **Overview**

1.130 The Firearms Licensing Section is responsible for managing and administering all firearms licensing matters within the Force area. This includes new applications, renewals and home visits. The Section is based at Force Headquarters and is resourced by four police staff members: a Manager and three Firearms Enquiry Officers.

### **Key Findings**

1.131 The Section operates in line with national guidance issued by the Home Office and ACPO, and has been successful in maintaining a record of making 100% of required home visits.

1.132 Following a national inspection of firearms licensing matters by the HMIC during 2002, the Section has developed an action plan to address all areas where national recommendations were made. The Police Authority approved this action plan.

1.133 The Section is undertaking preparatory work to enable it to adopt the National Firearms Licensing Management System, due for implementation in August 2004. This system will largely remove the need to maintain paper records.

1.134 As a result of a recent internal management review, the work of the Firearms Licensing Bureau has now been incorporated within the structure of the Force Intelligence Bureau.

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

1.135 This review has concluded that alignment of the Firearms Licensing Section with the Force Intelligence Bureau is the right way forward for the Force and will generate real benefits once the National Firearms Licensing Management System is fully operational.

1.136 This review has identified no recommendations for change and no areas for local management action other than those already being progressed through the action plan developed in response to the HMIC national Inspection of Firearms Licensing.

## **Organisation and Management of the Specialist Crime Service Division**

### **Overview**

- 1.137 The Specialist Crime Services Division (Q Division) is responsible for the delivery of a very broad range of policing functions, each of which is a specialist area in its own right. These functions are undertaken and delivered from a variety of geographical locations across the Force area.
- 1.138 Q Division is headed by a Detective Chief Superintendent who is supported by two Detective Superintendents (both Senior Investigating Officers and Function Managers), two Superintendents (Community Action and Criminal Justice Department); a Detective Chief Inspector (Deputy Director on Intelligence); and two Senior Police Staff Managers (Scientific Services and Administration Services).

### **Key Findings**

- 1.139 Feedback from managers on territorial divisions highlighted that, under the leadership of the current Divisional Commander, there had been an ongoing improvement in working relationships and that Q Division as a whole was now more customer-focused.
- 1.140 Standard procedures have been introduced across the whole division in relation to business planning and performance management. Although still relatively new, these processes are providing a common sense of purpose for the division. The review process also found a willingness to change and refine services to improve performance.
- 1.141 The major area of weakness in the current management structure of the division is the impact that operational commitments have on the functioning of the Divisional Management Team (DMT). In particular, those senior managers who are SIOs find it extremely difficult to balance this responsibility with their line management roles. This results in problems with communications and slow decision-making.
- 1.142 An additional weakness with the current management structure is the lack of a dedicated Personnel Officer post. As a division with over 200 members of staff, there are significant demands in terms of recruitment and selection, training and development, and welfare support. These are currently shared between line management and the Administration Services Manager.

1.143 During the course of the review a number of changes have been made to the management structure of the division. In line with the recommendations of the Best Value Review of Organisational Resilience, the Force Executive has recently increased the total number of SIO posts and have created an additional DCI post as Deputy Director of Intelligence. These changes are viewed as very positive but it is too early to tell if they will fully address the lack of resilience in the Q Division management structure.

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

1.144 This review has concluded that the management culture of Q Division is focused on supporting frontline policing and there is clear evidence of a willingness to develop services and improve performance. The division's management structure has undergone a number of recent changes but it is too soon to determine if these changes will fully address the lack of resilience in the DMT.

1.145 Taking into account the recently introduced changes to the management structure of the division, this review has identified no additional recommendations for change.

### **Issues for Local Management Action**

1.146 The Force Executive should re-examine the issue of management resilience within Q Division in order to determine whether recently introduced changes have alleviated the identified problems. This re-examination should take place prior to the end of the 2004/05 financial year.

1.147 The Q Division Management Team should seek to appoint a dedicated Personnel Officer to provide professional HR support to the Specialist Crime Services Division.

## 2.0 INTRODUCTION

2.1 The review of Specialist Crime Support forms a part of the year-four programme of Best Value Reviews of Bedfordshire Police. The review has been undertaken using the standard seven-stage methodology adopted by the Police Authority and the Force.

### **Specialist Crime Services Division (Q Division)**

2.2 The term '*specialist crime support*' covers an extremely wide range of policing functions and activities. However, all of these functions share a common purpose: they exist in order to support the provision of frontline policing services to the people of Bedfordshire.


2.3 In the majority of cases these Specialist Crime Support functions are managed, resourced and delivered as part of Q Division. The structure of Q Division is shown in the organisational chart on the next page (**see Figure 2**). It is important to note that there are some service areas where Q Division co-ordinates service provision on behalf of territorial divisions but where resources are drawn from across the whole Force. The most significant of these services is the investigation of major incidents.

### **Functions and Activities Excluded from the Scope of the Review**

2.4 Given the very broad range of specialist policing functions delivered by Q Division, initial work on the review sought to identify those which functions and activities which would or would not be included within remit of the project. As a result of this initial work, the Police Authority decided to exclude the following areas from the scope of the review:

<b>Table 1 – Functions Excluded from the Scope of the Review</b>	
<b>Function/Area</b>	<b>Rationale for Exclusion</b>
<b>Special Branch</b>	A highly sensitive area of policing that was due to be subject to national review by the HMIC during 2003/04.
<b>Dedicated Source Handling Unit</b>	A recently introduced pilot initiative that had only been in operation for a very short period of time and which would be subject to a separate evaluation process.
<b>PNC Bureau and Disclosure Unit</b>	This area was due to be subject to a thematic inspection by the HMIC and the unit's structure and operation would be examined in detailed as a part of the crime recording project.
<b>Q Division System Support Functions</b>	These functions were included within the scope of the IS/IT Best Value Review also taking place during 2003/04.
<b>Police Surgeon Services</b>	This service area would be examined as a part of the planned Best Value Review of Offender Handling.
<b>Management of Force Crime Policy</b>	Subject to continual review and revision and so deemed not appropriate to include within this form of review.
<b>Crime Auditing Function</b>	Subject to on-going and independent scrutiny in terms of compliance with National Standards.

**Figure 2: Structure of the Specialist Crime Services Division (Q Division) at March 2004**



## Principles for Conducting the Review

2.5 The initial scoping phase of the review sought to establish principles that would be used to shape how the study was conducted. These principles reflect best practice guidance for conducting Best Value Reviews issued by the Home Office<sup>1</sup>:

- (i) *The review should focus on addressing issues of strategic importance;*
- (ii) *The review should aim to identify opportunities to improve service delivery;*
- (iii) *The review should apply most effort to those areas identified as of key importance;*
- (iv) *The review should seek to recognise and build upon work undertaken in previous reviews and research (e.g. national studies, or internal management reviews).*

## Core Issue or Light Touch Review

2.6 A baseline assessment was conducted in order to determine which functions should be subject to a light-touch review and which were core issues meriting a more detailed examination. This baseline assessment resulted in the following classification:

<b>Table 2 – Approach Applied to the Review of Specialist Crime Support Functions</b>		
<b>Service Area</b>	<b>Approach</b>	<b>Rationale</b>
<b>Major Incident Unit</b>	Core aspect of the review	Due to the growing level and complexity of major incident investigations and implications in terms of abstracting staff from other roles.
<b>Drug Squad and Surveillance</b>	Core aspect of the review	Identified need to review the role of the Drugs Squad and potential implications of NIM in terms of Level 2 capability.
<b>Fraud Squad</b>	Core aspect of the review	Due to implementation of new legislation and issues in terms of retaining skilled staff.
<b>Scientific Services</b>	Light-touch approach	Previously subject to review by the Policing Standards Unit – examination of priority issues to progress to improve service and performance.
<b>Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB)</b>	Light-touch approach	To consider the impact of NIM on the role and remit of the FIB, most especially in terms of Level 2 Requirements.
<b>Criminal Justice Department</b>	Light-touch approach	To focus on ability of the Force to cope with the volume of new CJS legislation and developments.
<b>Organisation &amp; Management of Q Division</b>	Light-touch approach	To focus on ability of Q Division to maintain effective management and communication processes when senior managers are abstracted to major incident investigations.
<b>Child Protection</b>	Light-touch approach	To consider implications of national developments impacting on the provision of Child Protection Services.
<b>Community Action Department</b>	Light-touch approach	To consider issues arising from the recent internal management review of the Department.
<b>Coroner's Office</b>	Light-touch approach	To consider implications of national developments impacting on the Coroner's function.
<b>Firearm Licensing</b>	Light-touch approach	To consider national developments impacting on the Firearms Licensing function.

<sup>1</sup> *Best Value and Planning Guidance for Police Officers (2003)*

### **3.0 METHODOLOGY**

- 3.1 The review of Specialist Crime Support has been conducted using the Best Value process of challenging, consulting, comparing and competing – collectively known as the 4Cs.
- 3.2 The 4Cs methodology is designed to ensure that functions and services are examined from a variety of different perspectives. Outlined below is a summary of the way in which the 4Cs have been applied in conducting this review (also see **Appendix A**).

#### ***Challenge***

- 3.3 The review has sought to challenge whether Bedfordshire Police is making the most effective and efficient use of its specialist crime support resources. To that end, a series of one-to-one challenge meetings were held with a wide cross-section of staff within the organisation. In total, some 25 interviews were held involving members of the Force Executive, Divisional Commanders, Heads of Department and service providers.
- 3.4 Additional challenge was provided by nominated members of the Police Authority through a series of Scrutiny Panel meetings. This ensured that all aspects of Specialist Crime Support functions were examined and rigorously tested.
- 3.5 External challenge has been provided through two main channels:
- (i) At the emerging findings and options stage of the review, all key review documentation was subject to independent external challenge by the Best Value and Performance Review Manager of Bedford Borough Council;
  - (ii) Through meetings with Senior Officers in both Leicestershire Constabulary and Warwickshire Police. The Senior Officers involved were both experienced managers of specialist policing functions and both also had extensive knowledge of the Best Value process.

#### ***Consult***

- 3.6 Given the specialist nature of the policing services being examined by this review, and given that the majority of services are provided to support the work of other frontline police officers, it was decided that consultation would primarily be an internal process.

- 3.7 In addition to the one-to-one interviews held with managers and staff, a series of focus groups were also held involving staff across the organisation. In total 9 focus group meetings were held involving 48 Police Officers and 20 Police Staff representing both divisional staff (users) and Q Division staff (providers).
- 3.8 An e-mail circulation was also made to all staff in the Force inviting comments and encouraging participation in the consultation process. In total some 24 responses were received. Articles about the review were also included in the in-house staff magazine and in the Q Division staff newsletter.
- 3.9 Staff association representatives (Police Federation, Superintendents' Association, ACPO and UNISON) were all consulted during the course of the review and all of these groups were represented on the Police Authority Scrutiny Panel. Views were also sought from representatives of the Black and Asian Staff Support Group and the Lesbian and Gay Police Association
- 3.10 In arriving at the proposed recommendations, careful consideration has been given to ensure compatibility with the aims of the Race Equality Scheme, that is to:
- eliminate unlawful racial discrimination;
  - promote equality of opportunity;
  - promote good relations between people of different racial groups.
- 3.11 This has been achieved through:
- consideration of the review by the Force Diversity Advisor to ensure that the review met the standards set by the Race Equality Scheme;
  - external consultation with the Bedfordshire Police Independent Advisory Group;
  - staff association involvement and membership of the review panel throughout;
  - Police Authority Member scrutiny throughout.

### ***Compare***

- 3.12 There is no set of standard performance measures to use as the basis for comparing specialist crime support functions between different policing organisations. As such, the comparison element has been largely based on how forces organise and resource their specialist crime support functions.

3.13 Two visits were made to other police forces to compare their approach to the provision of Specialist Crime Support as against the position in Bedfordshire. The forces visited were:

- (i) Warwickshire Constabulary, which is a similar size force to Bedfordshire and so faces similar choices over resource priorities;
- (ii) Leicestershire Constabulary, which is in Bedfordshire's HMIC 'most similar forces group' and shares a number of similar community characteristics to Bedfordshire.

### ***Compete***

3.14 The specialist nature of the functions examined within the scope of this review was such that they were all core policing services that can only be delivered by organisations within the policing family. This meant that these functions were not suitable for direct competitive assessments.

3.15 As a proxy method of considering competition, the review examined opportunities to devolve functions from the centre to territorial divisions and opportunities to work in collaboration with other policing organisations. Professional judgement of experienced practitioners was also utilised to provide an assessment of competitiveness.

3.16 The structured interviews and focus groups held sought to identify where relevant services are currently bought-in and how effectively this process operates. Opportunities to extend the purchase of services were also briefly considered, along with opportunities to collaborate with other members of the policing family in the provision of services.

## 4.0 SETTING THE REVIEW IN CONTEXT

4.1 The best value review of specialist crime support has been driven by the desire to produce outcomes that improve the overall performance of Bedfordshire Police. As such, the review process has adopted a ‘whole organisation’ approach by focusing on how specialist crime support functions relate to frontline policing. Similarly, the review process has sought to take into account issues impacting on the Force that shape priorities and services.

4.2 At the emerging findings stage of the review, the Police Authority recognised the following three issues as having particular significance in terms of shaping the provision of specialist crime support functions:

- *Recruitment, retention and detective numbers within the organisation;*
- *Performance and accountability for policing services;*
- *Implementation of the National Intelligence Model.*

### **Recruitment, Retention and Detectives Numbers in the Organisation**

4.3 Following a sustained period of establishment decline during the mid-to-late 1990s, Bedfordshire Police has been successful at increasing police officer numbers over the last three years (see **Table 3** below).

**Table 3: Changes to Police Strength in Bedfordshire Police**

Year	Appointments		Wastage			Net increase (decrease) in Police Officers
	Appointments on probation	Transfers into Force*	Transfers from force	Ill-health retirements	Other wastage**	
1993/94	11	0	(2)	(9)	(37)	(37)
1994/95	17	3	(6)	(17)	(45)	(48)
1995/96	41	4	(6)	(14)	(82)	(57)
1996/97	7	0	(1)	(15)	(36)	(45)
1997/98	28	2	(7)	(22)	(37)	(36)
1998/99	61 <sup>1</sup>	2	(1)	(27)	(73)	(38)
1999/2000	33 <sup>1</sup>	2	(5)	(17)	(36)	(23)
2000/01	80 <sup>1</sup>	8	(18)	(17)	(36)	<b>17</b>
2001/02	132 <sup>1</sup>	3	(45)	(6)	(41)	<b>43</b>
2002/03	116 <sup>1</sup>	9	(27)	(7)	(58)	<b>33</b>

Sources: Bedfordshire Police personnel records, <sup>1</sup> Bedfordshire Police recruitment data

\* Includes staff rejoining the Force; \*\* Dismissals, ordinary retirements, voluntary resignations and deaths in service

- 4.4 One consequence of the sustained reduction in total officer numbers during mid-to-late 1990s was that the Force needed to prioritise how to deploy its remaining resources. The top priority chosen was to maintain frontline patrol strength: maintaining the resource levels of specialist functions was given a lower rating and so service development during this period was severely limited.
- 4.5 The increase in officer numbers since 2000 has been a positive development, however, **Table 3** highlights that due to the wastage of existing officers, this growth has necessitated a very demanding year-on-year programme of recruitment. One important consequence arising from this process has been that the average level of experience of frontline officers has reduced, due both to the increase in probationer numbers and to the loss of experienced staff.
- 4.6 The utilisation of experienced staff therefore becomes a critical part of maintaining effective organisational performance, i.e. striking the right balance between keeping experienced officers in frontline roles so as to support day-to-day policing activity whilst still ensuring that the organisation has sufficient capacity and capability to tackle specialist demands.

### **Recruiting and Retaining Detectives**

- 4.7 The issue of the number of experienced detectives available to the Force is clearly linked to the overall changing profile of the Force establishment. However, as a specialist role, detective numbers have also been impacted upon by a number of particular localised difficulties. These have included:
- The loss of experienced detective officers from particular areas of specialism, the most notable recent examples being the loss of Special Branch and Fraud officers to other forces;
  - Difficulty in attracting officers to apply for and train as detectives. The reasons for this particular problem are currently being examined by the Force and this work includes a review of CID shift patterns, which it is felt provide less in terms of work-life balance than the standard patrol officer shift pattern;
  - The ongoing high level of major incidents which serve to abstract detective officers from their core roles. This has the effect of limiting specialist skill development and places an ongoing workload burden on the remaining detective officers who have not been abstracted but then have to cover for their colleagues.

- 4.8 In developing the NIM 2003 National Strategic Assessment, ACPO highlighted that many forces in England and Wales have been experiencing problems with a lack of sufficient numbers of experienced detectives. This issue was viewed by ACPO as critical in terms of limiting efforts to tackle NIM Level 2 criminality.
- 4.9 Difficulties in recruiting and retaining detectives in the Force as a whole has a particularly important impact on the operation of Q Division, which has just over 40% of the total number of detectives of the Force within its establishment. In terms of Q Division detective posts it is worth noting that:
- (i) The vast majority of services provided by Q Division are investigatory functions that need to be delivered by skilled and experienced detectives. Some 98 of the 122 established police officer posts within Q Division are detective posts;
  - (ii) To staff its specialist posts, Q Division recruits internally from other parts of the organisation, primarily drawing on the pool of existing detectives who work in divisional CID roles.

### **Performance and Accountability for Policing Services**

- 4.10 The second issue of strategic significance recognised as forming a key part of the overall background or context to this review has been the growing trend for increased measurement, reporting and accountability for policing performance.
- 4.11 The development of police performance measurement has progressed through Inspections and Audits, Performance Indicators, Best Value Performance Plans, Basic Command Unit Comparisons and, most recently, the Policing Performance Assessment Framework. All of these various initiatives and approaches are designed to:
- provide for more clarity and transparency regarding policing performance;
  - allow for comparisons to be made, both over time and between different policing areas;
  - increase the accountability for local policing, internally; with the local community; and nationally with HMIC and the Home Office.

- 4.12 The focus on policing performance has had a particular emphasis on frontline policing services, both in terms of high volume crime areas (e.g. burglary and vehicle crime) and community-orientated aspects of policing (e.g. visible patrol or response times to incidents).
- 4.13 Given that the emphasis of performance measurement has been on frontline services, accountability for that performance has naturally been invested in those parts of the organisation responsible for delivering those services – the Basic Command Units (BCUs). Very few measures and targets have been set which relate directly to the specialist policing functions that are delivered by Q Division.
- 4.14 This general lack of performance measures for specialist policing activity is important in terms of this review because:
- (i) it prevents meaningful comparisons of performance between specialist policing functions in different forces;
  - (ii) it indicates that those responsible for creating the framework for assessing policing performance do not view these specialist services as high profile;
  - (iii) it emphasises the need for specialist functions to provide effective support to BCUs, i.e. to assist them to deliver frontline services for which there is direct performance accountability.

### **Implementation of the National Intelligence Model**

- 4.15 Bedfordshire Police is committed to the National Intelligence Model (NIM), full implementation of which took place in April 2004. NIM represents a key development in the Force's policing style and will have major implications for the way in which the organisation operates. In particular, NIM will provide a standardised approach to the management of information and intelligence that operates across the whole organisation.
- 4.16 The key driver behind NIM is to notion of transforming passive information into active intelligence that can then be used to direct operational policing. This active intelligence could be used to reduce crime, disrupt criminal activity or to assist in the investigation of offences.

4.17 NIM also requires that, at various levels within the organisation, strategic and tactical assessments are undertaken in order to identify those priority issues that will be addressed through the operation of its NIM Control Strategy.

4.18 The structured approach that underpins NIM means that a standard set of approaches for the collation, analysis and assessment of intelligence takes place to cover issues at three different levels:

- **NIM Level 1** activity is concerned with crime and incident related intelligence that operates within the boundaries of a BCU;
- **NIM Level 2** activity is concerned with crime and incident related intelligence that operate across BCU boundaries. These boundaries may be internal to Bedfordshire or involve other police forces;
- **NIM Level 3** activity is concerned with serious and organised crime that operates on a national or international scale.

4.19 In terms of the way in which NIM relates to the operation of Q Division, three areas of particular importance have been identified which are relevant to this review:

- (i) Those specialist functions which directly support frontline policing activity need to develop the ability to respond to BCU NIM Level 1 requirements;
- (ii) The systems and processes operated by the Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB) need to develop to provide the Force with its NIM Level 2 analysis and tasking capability;
- (iii) The specialist policing resources within Q Division need to be tasked and deployed to support NIM activity, and in particular will provide key aspects of the Force's NIM Level 2 capability.

4.20 As a key strategic background issue impacting upon the review of specialist crime support, it is important to recognise that NIM is being implemented as a separate project with its own process of assessment and review. However, this review has sought to take NIM implications into account, particularly so in terms of changes that might be required in processes and capabilities needed to support NIM Level 2 activity.

# REVIEW OF SPECIALIST CRIME SUPPORT FUNCTIONS


## 5.0 MAJOR INCIDENT UNIT

### Overview

5.1 The role of the Major Incident Unit (MIU) is to support Senior Investigating Officers in undertaking the effective investigation of major incidents by setting-up major incident rooms and co-ordinating the deployment of staff to major incident room roles. In addition, the MIU is also responsible for providing HOLMES computer training, co-ordination of the Family Liaison function and for operating the HOLMES Casualty Bureau procedure.

### Structure and Staffing

5.2 The structure and staffing of the Major Incident Unit is outlined in **Figure 3** below:



### Major Incident Classification

5.3 All major incident investigations vary in terms of their nature, complexity and sensitivity. However, all such incidents are classified into one of three categories:

- Category A Incidents – Cases of grave public concern;
- Category B Incidents – Cases where there are potential complicating factors or where the identify of the offender or offenders is unknown;
- Category C Incidents – Cases where the identity of the offender or offenders is known or apparent.

- 5.4 Between 1997 and 2002, Bedfordshire dealt with 3 Category A incidents, 22 Category B incidents and 30 Category C incidents, many of which ran concurrently.

### Staffing Major Incident Investigation

- 5.5 The designation of the classification of a major incident is made by the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) leading the enquiry. In line with Force policy, the classification decision is a key trigger point for the level of staffing needed to undertake the investigation. The Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative Procedures (MIRSAP) national guidance manual defines the various roles and responsibilities required to operate a major incident room. The Force's own Major Crime Policy & Procedure defines uses the MIRSAP model as the basis for defining minimum staffing levels required for different categories of incidents. However, the needs of each major incident are considered on an individual basis and staffing levels are reviewed regularly.
- 5.6 The number of investigating officers allocated to an incident to undertake enquiries is dependent on the nature and complexity of the incident. The agreed minimum staffing level is detailed in the **Table 4** below:


<b>Table 4 – Minimum Staffing Levels for Major Incident Investigations</b>			
<b>Enquiry Team Staffing</b>	<b>Category A</b>	<b>Category B</b>	<b>Category C</b>
Host Division to Provide	11	9 to 11	4
Territorial Divisions to Provide	20	12 to 20	6
Q Division to Provide	5	3 to 5	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>24 to 36</b>	<b>12</b>

- 5.7 The model staffing numbers for HOLMES incident room roles are shown in **Table 5** below.

<b>Table 5 – Minimum HOLMES Room Staffing Levels for Major Incidents</b>			
<b>Incident Room Role</b>	<b>Category A</b>	<b>Category B</b>	<b>Category C</b>
Receiver	1	1	1
Statement Reader	1	1	1
Officer Manager	1	1	Optional
Indexers	4	2 or 3	2
Disclosure Officer	1	1	1
Action Allocator	1	Optional	Optional
Researcher	1 or 2	1	Optional
Gofer	1	1	Optional
<b>Total</b>	<b>11 or 12 minimum</b>	<b>8 or 9 minimum</b>	<b>5 minimum</b>

## The Level of Major Incidents in Bedfordshire

- 5.8 Major incidents occur on a relatively infrequent basis and vary significantly in terms of their complexity. When they do occur, the resources that are required to support major incident investigations are high, as illustrated by the minimum staffing levels shown in **Tables 4 and 5**. These two factors of infrequency and intensity create a problem for the organisation in terms of determining how best to structure and organise resources to deal with what is a very high profile but irregular level of demand.
- 5.9 Currently the Force responds to major incidents by abstracting staff from their normal roles to resource the investigation. Police officers are abstracted to undertake both HOLMES incident room roles and outside enquiry team roles; the duration an individual is abstracted depends on the role they perform and the complexity of the inquiry.
- 5.10 Statistics show that, relative to its size, Bedfordshire has a comparative high number of major incidents with 86 homicides recorded during the period from 1991 to 2001. Relative to the strength of the Force, that rate was markedly higher than other forces in Bedfordshire's family of most similar forces.
- 5.11 **Figure 4** below illustrates the impact that the high level of major incidents has on the Force. The specific problem is that, in comparative terms, Bedfordshire has a smaller resource pool to draw on to investigate major incidents and so their impact on the organisation and its performance is likely to be greater. This impact on performance was acknowledged by the HMIC in their report on the Inspection of Luton BCU published in May 2003.



## **The Impact of Major Incidents on the Operation of the Force**

- 5.12 Internal consultation undertaken for this review has revealed a strong consensus that the Force is very professional in its approach to major incident investigations and performs this function to a very high standard. However, the consequence of resourcing these investigations has repeatedly been highlighted as a key area of organisational weakness.
- 5.13 The concerns expressed by managers and staff about the impact of resourcing major incidents relate primarily to the following areas:
- (i) As the Force does not have a standing major incident team, all the staff needed to investigate such incidents have to be provided by abstracting them away from their normal core policing roles. The relatively high number of major incidents in Bedfordshire creates an on-going disparity between the disposition of resources on paper and actual staff deployment. As an example of this, figures for Dunstable Division show that CID officers were abstracted for an average of 110 days each during 2002;
  - (ii) The growing complexity of major incident investigations, particularly in key roles such as disclosure, means that staff members are often abstracted for significant periods of time. This makes it extremely difficult to adequately cover their normal core policing role;
  - (iii) Existing problems in terms of recruiting and retaining detective officers are compounded by the need to supply staff to major incident investigations: the Force is having to continually draw on a relatively small pool of officers whose skills are in demand for both day-to-day frontline policing and specialist investigation;
  - (iv) There is an ongoing organisational tension around the release of staff to major incidents and in seeking their release back to their normal core role. All managers and staff accept the need to resource major investigations but maintaining a corporate approach can prove problematic when resources are under pressure;
  - (v) The performance of the Force is judged primarily by how well it delivers frontline services and by the results it achieves in terms of volume crime performance: major incident abstractions divert significant resources away from these key performance areas but this impact is not reflected in the performance management regime;

- (vi) The fact that staff members are abstracted from their normal roles does not prevent the continuation of day-to-day workload. Those members of staff who are not abstracted to major incidents are required to provide cover for their colleagues and this means absorbing additional workload. This has a disproportionate impact on small teams of staff;
- (vii) The Force relies on staff volunteering to train in key HOLMES incident room roles. There is an ongoing problem in attracting sufficient volunteers and in ensuring that they retain their skill level.

5.14 The difficulties and pressures which the Force faces in resourcing major incident investigations creates a knock-on affect which impacts on the operation of the whole organisation. In particular:

- The complexity of major incident investigations requires the use of experienced staff, many of whom perform core roles as detectives. This means drawing resources disproportionately away from CID roles at a time when the Force is already facing difficulty in recruiting and retaining detectives;
- The sheer effort and manpower that needs to go into a major incident investigation is not reflected in policing performance measurement but the inevitable impact of major incidents is to divert resources away from visible areas of performance;
- The Force's ability to sustain an intelligence-led policing approach is dependent upon the ability to maintain a proactive capability that can be deployed to deal with identified problems. When resources are abstracted to major incidents this flexibility is largely lost, as the focus of effort is required to move back toward simply sustaining an adequate reactive response to policing problems.


5.15 The difficulty created by major incident abstractions is by no means unique to Bedfordshire, although the volume of major incidents experienced by the Force does make the problem particularly acute. Comparisons made with Leicestershire and Warwickshire showed that:

Warwickshire Police – As a small Force similar in size to Bedfordshire, Warwickshire has no standing major incident team but resource enquiries by abstracting staff from other roles. The Force does have a small HOLMES team consisting of four staff. The Force is currently examining the potential to employ permanent HOLMES Indexers. On occasions the Force uses trained staff and facilities from West Midlands Police;

Leicestershire Constabulary - With an establishment almost twice that of Bedfordshire, Leicestershire operate both a permanent HOLMES Team and a Major Crime Team. The HOLMES Team comprises 5 Support Staff Supervisors, 8 police officer indexers (shortly to be civilianised) and a HOLMES Trainer. The permanent standing Major Crime Team has 2 Detective Inspectors, 5 Detective Sergeants, 30 Detective Constables and 6 Disclosure/Exhibits Officers.

### Organisational Response to Major Incidents

- 5.16 The preceding sections of this report have highlighted why the resource pressures created by staffing major incidents was identified as a key strategic issue for this review. Accepting this as problem to address, the question switches to a consideration of what the Force can do to tackle this problem.
- 5.17 The range of options available is highlighted in **Figure 5** below, with the level of dedicated resources required to provide the solution increasing from left to right.




- 5.18 At the current time the Force operates at the left-hand end of the continuum illustrated in **Figure 5**, with an approach which is dedicated resource light and ad hoc in nature. This review has highlighted the difficulties inherent with this current approach. A 'no change' option would do nothing to address this strategic weakness.
- 5.19 Internal consultation undertaken for this review showed a mixed range of opinion over whether the Force should move to the right-hand end of the continuum, i.e. by creating both a standing HOLMES Team and a Major Incident Team of investigators. In terms of a Major Incident Team, based on the views expressed and comparisons made with other forces, to fit the needs of Bedfordshire such a unit would require 1 Detective Inspector, 5 Detective Sergeants and 25 Detective Constables.
- 5.20 There was a clear consensus that this standing unit approach would be the ideal solution for the Force but there were very mixed views over whether this was really a practicable way forward. Some managers felt that the ongoing nature of major incident demands were such that the Force should "bite the bullet" and create a Major Incident Team. However, other managers felt that in moving to this arrangement, the Force would inevitably have to lose a significant number of experienced detectives from frontline roles.
- 5.21 The conclusion of this review is that the creation of a standing Major Incident Team is not the right solution for the Force at the present time because it does not address the key strategic issues driving this review. In particular, it would mean removing staff from divisional CID roles at a time when the Force already has problems recruiting and retaining detectives, thereby creating an experience gap in day-to-day frontline policing. Permanently removing experienced detectives from frontline roles would also have a detrimental impact on the visible performance of the Force.
- 5.22 The middle ground option of creating a permanent team of support staff HOLMES Indexers received very broad support across all sections of the organisation, although some managers expressed concern over what such staff would do during any down-time from major incident investigations. The key benefits of creating a permanently staff HOLMES Team were seen as being:
- Freeing-up frontline officers (both detectives and uniformed staff) to return to their core policing roles, i.e. a reduced need for abstraction;
  - Improved quality and efficiency in the operation of incident rooms because staff would more regularly exercise their HOLMES skills.

- 5.23 When judged against the key strategic issues driving this review, the option to create a permanent HOLMES Team utilising police support staff scores extremely well because this solution takes some of the pressure off frontline staff and so helps to address recruitment and retention issues. It also enables more staff to remain in frontline roles.
- 5.24 In terms of how this approach compares with that adopted by other Forces neighbouring Bedfordshire, an e-mail survey showed that Cambridgeshire, Northamptonshire, Hertfordshire and Thames Valley all employ permanent police staff HOLMES Indexers.
- 5.25 It is the conclusion of this review that implementing a permanent team of HOLMES Indexers represents the more realistic way forward for the Force if it wishes to address the problems created by resourcing major incident investigations

### HOLMES Indexer Team

- 5.26 To staff a permanent HOLMES Team would require a team of sufficient numbers to meet something approaching a normal incident room workload. This would ensure that staff members were as fully deployed as possible and so bring maximum benefit to the Force.
- 5.27 These permanent staff would then provide the core of incident room staffing but they would still need to be supported by other HOLMES trained staff as necessary. The number of staff needing to be HOLMES trained would, however, be reduced overall.
- 5.28 An analysis of staffing levels over the period September 2002 to September 2003, a relatively quiet period for major incidents, has shown that at no time were there less than 10 staff working in HOLMES Incident room roles (see **Figure 6** below)



5.29 Using this minimum staffing level in **Figure 6** as the guide, the cost to resource a permanent HOLMES Team would be:

- **10 Indexer Posts (Grade 4) at £18,408 p.a. = £184,080**

5.30 This proposal would enable the Force to release police resources back to front-line duties and/or take some pressure off the limited number of detectives in the Force. In terms of efficiency savings, the amount achieved would depend on the effectiveness and level of utilisation of the HOLMES staff, i.e. swapping hidden cost for direct cost.

5.31 Working on the current average cost of a Constable on Dunstable Division (£26,787) then three level of potential efficiency savings are outlined below:

- (i) HOLMES Team 85% effective in replacing the work previously done by police staff, i.e. 15% unproductive downtime. Efficiency saving of 85% the cost of the PCs less the cost of new posts. This equates to £227,690 less £184,080 = **£43,610 p.a.**
- (ii) HOLMES Team effective in replacing 100% of the work previously done by police officers, i.e. a direct switch of police for support staff. Efficiency saving of 100% the cost of the PCs less cost of new posts. This equates to £267,870 less £184,080 = **£83,790 p.a.**
- (iii) HOLMES Team effective in replacing 130% of the work previously done by police staff, i.e. permanent support staff are more efficient because they do the role all the time. Efficiency saving of 130% the cost of the PCs less cost of new posts. This equates to £348,231 less £184,080 = **£164,151 p.a.**

5.32 It is considered that the efficiency gain of 130% is the most realistic outcome because permanent staff will be more used to their role as Indexers and because improved supervision will help to better manage tasks. However, to maximise the impact of this change it is also felt that the Force should examine the business benefits that could be derived from creating a small number of permanent Disclosure/Exhibit Officer posts (which could be either police officer or police staff posts).

## **Functions and Responsibilities of HOLMES Indexers during Downtime**

5.33 In order to ensure the Force gained maximum benefit from the HOLMES Indexer staff, it would need to ensure that functions and responsibilities were identified for these staff to undertake during any downtime. It is suggested that these duties could include:

- Assisting in the exhibits officer role, an additional training requirement but a demanding and time consuming role normally performed by police officers;
- Being reallocated to duties in another operational incident room, the aim being to continually minimise the number of police performing HOLMES roles;
- Archiving material from previous major incidents of which there is a considerable back-log force-wide;
- Undertaking HOLMES Training to maintain and develop core skills;
- Undertaking Casualty Bureau training planning to ensure the Force has sufficient trained staff and to practice the operational plan;
- Assisting SIOs in conducting cold-case reviews. This is an area which the Force has not yet had sufficient spare capacity to explore;
- Assisting in other high volume areas of demand within Q Division, e.g. disclosure unit, intelligence checks, and subscriber checks.

## **Family Liaison Officer Co-ordination**

5.34 The Head of the Major Incident Unit is responsible for co-ordinating the training and deployment of Family Liaison Officers (FLOs). The Force has 10 officers trained in FLO roles to support major incident investigations. A further 12 officers are trained to support the families of victims of fatal road accident. These officers have their role co-ordinated by the Head of the Collision Investigation Unit.

5.35 The FLO role is a demanding and sometimes stressful one with individuals acting as the key point of contact between the families of victims and those officers undertaking the investigation. This FLO role normally requires a long-term and ongoing relationship to be developed with the families of victims.

5.36 The importance of the FLO role in contributing to effective investigation and communication has been highlighted in both the Stephen Lawrence and Damilola Taylor Inquiries. These enquiries recognised the importance of training, supervision and welfare support for FLOs.

- 5.37 An independent examination of the Forces FLO arrangements was undertaken in February 2003 by an advisor from the National Crime and Operations Faculty. This work identified aspects of good practice (e.g. in the quality of logs kept by FLOs) but also highlighted the lack of resilience in the current arrangements, most especially that the Force only has one co-ordinator who also holds key responsibilities in relation to HOLMES incidents. The lack of formal training for the co-ordinator was also highlighted as a weakness.
- 5.38 Since this external examination of the FLO function was undertaken, a database has been created within the MIU to track the deployment and availability of FLOs. Consultation undertaken during this review highlighted that the introduction of this database was a very positive development. FLOs also highlighted the good level of welfare support they receive from the Head of the MIU. However, consultation also showed that the lack of resilience and lack of formal FLO training for the Head of MIU still needed to be addressed.

### **Casualty Bureau**

- 5.39 A further responsibility of the Major Incident Unit is to provide training and co-ordination of the HOLMES Casualty Bureau function. This is a function jointly organised with the Operations Support Division who provide the call handling capability to support a major incident or disaster generating multiple casualties.
- 5.40 Due to major incident commitments, the Force has not had the capacity to adequately develop, train and test its casualty bureau procedures. This is an acknowledged area of weakness, particularly given that the Force area contains an international airport and a number of key road and rail routes. However, this situation is unlikely to change unless there is a sustained downturn in major incident demands or unless the Force is able to increase its capacity and resilience for the HOLMES function.

### **Key Recommendations**

<b>Recommendation 1</b>
<b>The Force should create a permanent HOLMES team capacity to support the investigation of major incidents by appointing ten police staff HOLMES Indexers.</b>

- 5.41 This recommendation would require budget growth to fund the appointment of 10 support staff posts. It is estimated that this development will cost approximately £184,000 p.a.

## Benefits of this Recommendation

5.44 The expected benefits of this recommendation are as follows

- This proposal will generate a clear efficiency saving for the Force, estimated to be in the region of c. £164,000 p.a;
- Police resources, both uniform and CID, currently abstracted to major incidents will be released back to frontline duties;
- The process for initially setting up an incident room will be quicker and more efficient, thereby providing improved support to the Senior Investigating Officer;
- The Force will maximise the benefits on its investment in HOLMES 2 and associated training through the development of expert indexers;
- There will be an improved ability to manage the deployment of trained staff between different HOLMES Incident Rooms;
- The Force will have increased capacity to plan and prepare for casualty bureau requirements.

## **Progress Against the Recommendation**

5.42 It is published HMIC best practice for forces to 'fast-track' the implementation of recommendations where this would bring about a rapid improvement in service or address identified problem areas.

5.43 The recommendation to implement a permanent HOLMES indexer team was recognised as a priority issue at the 'emerging findings' stage of the review. Given that implementation required the establishment of new posts, a growth item was included in the 2004/05 budget proposals. The Police Authority gave approval for this funding in February 2004. These positions have now been advertised and the intention is to appoint people into post commencing in September 2004.

5.45 An integral part of the Force's best value methodology is a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) monitoring process which tracks the progress of implementation of agreed recommendations and assesses the extent to which expected and anticipated benefits are actually delivered. Results of this monitoring are regularly reported to the Police Authority.

### **Management Action Recommendations**

5.46 The Q Division Management Team should

- (i) identify a post holder to act as a second Family Liaison Officer Co-ordinator and ensure that both Family Liaison Officer Co-ordinators undertake a suitable FLO training course;
- (ii) ensure that the Head of the MIU and one other nominated post-holder undertake the Casualty Bureau training course;
- (iii) ensure that, prior to the end of the 2004/05 financial year, an exercise to test the Force's Casualty Bureau plan is conducted;
- (iv) should develop a business case setting out the costs and benefits for establishing permanent Disclosure/Exhibits Officer posts to support major incident investigations (these posts could be police officer or police staff roles).


## 6.0 FORCE DRUG SQUAD AND SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY

### Overview

6.1 The Force Drug Squad is a team of highly skilled and experienced detectives. The primary functions of the Squad are:

- (i) To utilise its expertise in drug enforcement and surveillance techniques to support Force objectives in tackling crime and reducing the supply of class 'A' drugs (particularly heroin, cocaine and crack cocaine);
- (ii) To focus its activity on investigating and prosecuting those involved in drug trafficking offences and seeks to disrupt and dismantle criminal organisations that deal in the distribution of drugs;
- (iii) To provide a mobile surveillance capability for the Force;
- (iv) To assist in the investigation of major incidents.

6.2 The current structure and staffing of the Force Drug Squad is outlined in **Figure 7** below:



## **Surveillance Operations**

- 6.3 Conducting surveillance operations is a resource intensive activity that can only be undertaken by specially trained staff: mobile surveillance operations usually require the use of 4 or 5 vehicles and involve about 11 people. Sustaining surveillance operations over any length of time therefore becomes a very expensive method of collecting intelligence and evidence. However, when they are successful, surveillance operations produce results that form very strong evidence at Court.
- 6.4 The Force Drugs Squad supplies the Force's primary surveillance capability. All Drug Squad officers are trained and accredited to conduct Level 1 surveillance operations. The Special Branch Section also has a surveillance capability but this is primarily directed towards addressing national security issues. The two teams do, however, undertake joint operations and support each other in maintaining an ongoing operational capability.

## **Competing Demands for the Specialist Skills of the Drug Squad**

- 6.5 As a small Force, Bedfordshire has only a limited ability to dedicate resources to specialist investigations. However, the Force faces a number of competing demands for this limited supply of specialist skills and so needs to make rational choices over which of these to treat as a priority. These competing demands include such issues as the need to:
- (i) tackle organised drug dealing and supply;
  - (ii) target and disrupt prolific offenders;
  - (iii) gather intelligence and evidence for major incident investigations;
  - (iv) respond to other forms of serious and organised crime.

## **NIM Level 2 Capability**

- 6.6 Internal consultation undertaken during the review revealed a strong and growing degree of concern over the level of resources which the Force currently has available to tackle NIM Level 2 operations. In particular, both divisional commanders and detectives working in central functions expressed concern that the Force has insufficient surveillance capability to support NIM driven operations, the work of the Drug Squad and major incident requirements.

- 6.7 Concern over the Force's level of surveillance capability has also been expressed during the recent HMIC BCU Inspections of both Luton and North Bedfordshire Divisions. The specific comments made by the HMIC were as follows:

Luton BCU Inspection Report (May 2002) – *'As the BCU (and the Force) become more proficient with the NIM, the need for surveillance will increase and it is suggested that the Force considers re-introducing a dedicated surveillance capacity.'*

North Bedfordshire BCU Inspection Report (March 2003) – *'It is recommended that the Force review the systems and level of resources available at HQ to support BCUs in tackling levels 1 and 2 criminality. The review should focus on the availability of a proactive and a mobile surveillance capability.'*

- 6.8 A recent examination of the Force's progress in implementing NIM, undertaken by the ACPO NIM Project Team in November 2003, also adversely commented on the Force's limited Level 2 capability. The particular concern highlighted here was that, as NIM processes develop, more demand for surveillance would be generated. This increased demand will require a positive response in order to sustain the effort required to generate and analyse intelligence.
- 6.9 Research undertaken by ACPO in developing the NIM 2003 National Strategic Assessment has identified that a lack of NIM Level 2 capability is a problem common to many Forces in England and Wales. Weakness in this area has arisen due to increased workload demands (in areas such as organised crime and people trafficking) combined with a national shortage of experienced detectives.
- 6.10 Internal consultation revealed a great deal of support for NIM and for the potential benefits this approach will bring to the organisation. It was recognised that the Force had greatly improved its intelligence assessment capability following the introduction of intelligence units, analyst roles and tasking processes. However, this improvement had not yet been matched by an expansion in the Force's capacity to conduct and sustain proactive covert operations. Managers and staff both felt that a whole system approach was required if full return is to be achieved on the investment the Force has made in NIM.

6.11 The concerns and criticisms made regarding Level 2 capability were not purely concerned with the issue of surveillance capability. Other areas identified requiring improvement were:

- Technical support, particularly technical and intrusive surveillance resources and the level of support provided to frontline staff;
- Field intelligence capability, particularly the development of intelligence packages for Level 2 target criminals. *(This issue is considered in Section 9 of this report that deals with the operation of the Force Intelligence Bureau).*

### **Activity Based Costing Data on Drug Related Activities**

6.12 Activity Analysis on work by BCU based officers shows that they spend approximately 3% of their time on drugs related crime matters. Most of this activity relates to offences of possession or possession with intent to supply for Class B and Class C drugs. During 2003/04 the Force dealt with 900 people for offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act.

6.13 Drug Squad officers focus their activity on tackling dealers engaged in supplying Class A drugs. Activity analysis conducted in 2002/03 showed that the Drug Squad spent 46% of their time on drugs operations, 32% of time on major incident and divisional operations, and 22% of time on administration and court appearances.

### **Issues Raised During Internal Consultation**

6.14 The key issues identified during the internal consultation process relating to the work of the Drug Squad and current surveillance capability in the Force are summarised below:

- (i) The need to abstract detectives performing specialist roles to support major incidents was seen as a fact of life in a force the size of Bedfordshire, no matter what structure there was for the drugs or surveillance functions;
- (ii) It was felt that the Drug Squad had actually lost its focus on drugs, primarily because of its use on major incidents. Some staff and managers felt that the Force had a Drug Squad “in name only”;
- (iii) Divisional frontline staff felt that because the target criminals normally taken on by the Drug Squad were upper-Level 2 NIM criminals, the support given to divisions in dealing with street dealers was very limited;

- (iv) Some staff and managers felt that the Drug Squad should be disbanded as a central unit and devolved to divisions where small groups of 3 or 4 officers could focus on street dealers and provide more direct support to front-line officers;
- (v) There was very widespread support for the view that the Force needs to improve its level of surveillance capability. Managers and staff strongly felt that this should be a priority area for the Force because NIM would increasingly lead to targeted operations against prolific offenders;
- (vi) One key issue repeatedly raised, but about which there were very mixed views, was whether the role of Drug Squad and Surveillance Unit should be split, i.e. a dedicated surveillance team and a Level 2 serious crime team;
- (vii) Some staff expressed doubt over whether there was sufficient workload to have a dedicated surveillance team that only dealt with Level 2 criminality, indeed some of the demand was for support in dealing with prolific Level 1 offenders;
- (viii) The option to develop a surveillance capability jointly with other forces was seen as viable, as was the option to use support staff to undertake surveillance. However, both of these areas were seen as longer-term issues to be explored once the Force was clear about the capability it required.

### **Approaches Adopted by other Forces**

6.15 All police forces face a very similar range of demands in relation to NIM Level 2 requirements. However, the structural configuration of functions and resources they deploy in response to these demands varies significantly. The main factors that shape how these specialist functions are organised are: the size of the Force; the size of its Basic Command Units; its geography (physical spread and main population centres); and its local priorities.

6.16 Comparisons undertaken with other police forces highlighted the fact that each force develops a different solution to the provision of these specialist functions. For example:

- Warwickshire Police has a dedicated surveillance unit that is tasked and deployed via the NIM process. Much of the work of this unit is focused on street level drug dealers because the regional *Operation Middle Market* team takes on the higher-level drug targets. In October 2003, Warwickshire established a small team of six officers to take on other NIM Level 2 targets;

- Leicestershire Constabulary does not have a dedicated surveillance unit or drugs squad; instead it runs a Special Operations Unit that takes on upper-Level 2 targets. It was a strategic decision of the Force to address upper-Level 2 criminality given particular local problems with drug dealing, gun crime and human trafficking. However, the Force recognised that by seeking to address upper-Level 2 criminality it would mean being less able to deal with lower-Level 2 cross-divisional crimes;
- Hertfordshire Constabulary has invested significant resources in its surveillance function and has a dedicated team of support staff who are trained to Level 1 and who take on both Level 1 and Level 2 NIM targets. The Force also has a Central Detective Unit of 12 officers who are also surveillance trained and who deal with Level 2 criminality and major incidents.

6.17 In terms of whether other forces operate a dedicated Drug Squad, a recent telephone survey of 12 forces in the south and midlands showed that:

- 4 forces had a dedicated drug squad;
- 5 forces operated a dedicated surveillance team/major crime team;
- 3 forces had no standing specialist crime squad operating at the centre.

### **The National Intelligence Model as a Shaping Factor**


6.18 It is clear from the results of both consultation and comparison that there is no one ideal solution for the provision of a capability in relation to surveillance, drug dealing and other serious criminality.

6.19 There was general consensus internally that it would be desirable to increase the Force's surveillance capability but mixed views about whether that increase should be at the expense of resources committed to other functions or be achieved through growth.

6.20 Given the variety of preferences expressed and the wide range of alternative structural options available, the key is to determine the capabilities that best meet the needs of the Force, taking into account the limited resources available. This determination also needs to be guided by the three strategic background issues underpinning this review:

- The National Intelligence Model;
- Improving organisational performance;
- The recruitment and retention of detectives.

6.21 The Force has been developing its approach to the NIM over the last two years, initially focusing on divisional policing (NIM Level 1 issues) and more latterly developing processes and procedures for centrally-based resources (in terms of NIM Level 2 issues). The balance and co-ordination that needs to be struck between Level 1 and Level 2 issues is outlined in **Figure 8** below:



6.22 NIM brings with it two key processes which will help to shape the Level 2 capability requirements of the Force:

- A Control Strategy process, based on a detailed strategic assessment of issues faced by the Force, which sets-out priorities in terms of intelligence, prevention and enforcement activity;
- A Force Tasking and Tactical Co-ordinating Process, Chaired by the Assistant Chief Constable, which considers alternative courses of action, determines priorities and then makes decisions about the deployment of resources designed to achieve maximum impact.

6.23 This review has concluded that the future tactical capability requirements of the Force will primarily be shaped by NIM processes rather than by a separate decision-making process. This means that identified need will determine service requirements rather than tactical responses being shaped around existing capabilities.


6.24 The practical implications of this NIM-driven approach have yet to be fully felt but in the longer-term it could well lead to a change in the mix of services provided in-force or via collaborative arrangements with other organisations. The options for future change are vast but might involve such things as greater use of technical and mobile surveillance, financial investigation or computer forensic examinations.

### Getting the Balance Right

6.25 One of the main issues raised during the internal consultation process for this review was whether the Force has got the balance right in terms of the resource it commits to providing a surveillance capability and whether the Force should continue to operate a dedicated Drug Squad.

6.26 The Drug Squad currently has a primary remit of tackling organised crime relating to drug supply offences; a secondary remit in relation to the provision of a surveillance capability; and a standing, and in practice, over-arching remit to assist in major incident investigations.

6.27 Essentially the problem that the Force currently faces in this area is that it is trying to spread one group of resources to meet different types of demand. This means that no one set of requirements is being adequately met. The current situation is illustrated in the **Figure 9** below:



6.28 Internal consultation has suggested that the resources of the Drug Squad are insufficient to effectively perform all of the roles within its remit. Similarly, consultation revealed that the ideal solution for the Force would be to split the work of the Drug Squad into its component elements, i.e. a dedicated surveillance team, a small dedicated drug team and a major incident investigation team. However, in order to deliver dedicated units in each of these functional areas would require a significant increase in overall resource levels, for example:

- Surveillance Team: 16 constables
- Drug Squad: 8 constables
- Major Incident Team: 20 constables
  
- **An estimated total of 44 posts compared to the current Drug Squad establishment of 16 constable posts**

6.29 Increasing the number of specialist posts operating at the centre by 28 extra officers (most of who would be detectives) would clearly improve the level of service provision. However, it is the conclusion of this review that the removal of such a substantial number of detectives from frontline BCU roles would have a negative impact on overall Force performance. Instead, the Force should seek to implement a solution which boosts capacity at the centre but which has a minimal impact on BCU detective numbers.

### **Resource Available for NIM Level 2 Operations**

6.30 Internal consultation has strongly suggested that the resources of the current Drug Squad are insufficient to effectively perform all of the roles within its remit. However, this review has concluded that to establish separate dedicated teams to perform all of the roles of the current Drug Squad would not be in the best interests of the Force as a whole.

6.31 In seeking to reconcile these two factors, consideration has been given as to how the Force could address its major shortcomings in this area but deliver improvements with a level of resources that is realistic for a force the size of Bedfordshire.

6.32 The main weakness with the current level of resources of the Drug Squad is a lack of resilience to conduct and sustain policing operations, particularly when major incidents are ongoing. With only 15 operational Constable posts, and a minimum of 11 officers required to conduct a mobile surveillance operation, any reduction in available resources (e.g. rest days, annual leave, appearing at Court) makes it extremely difficult to sustain surveillance operations.

- 6.33 The fact that these same officers are experienced detectives also means that their skills are in demand for major incident investigations and so officers can be abstracted for significant periods of time. Once staffing levels fall below a certain minimum, the unit loses its ability to conduct surveillance operations and although resource levels can be boosted by utilising surveillance trained officers from Special Branch, sustaining operations and continuity is very difficult.
- 6.34 The resources of the Drug Squad have changed over time to reflect policing priorities and the budgetary position of the Force. Until the creation of the Dedicated Source Handling Team, the Drug Squad had an establishment of 20 constables and undertook its own intelligence development functions. Previous to that, the Force operated with a smaller dedicated Drug Squad of 10 officers and a separate Crime Support Unit of 16 officers who undertook surveillance operations. These two units merged partly because of budget restrictions and partly because it was considered that the Crime Support Unit was not functioning effectively.
- 6.35 Using previous experience as a guide, the Drugs Squad needs sufficient capacity to undertake surveillance operations (i.e. around 16 officers) and sufficient capacity to investigate drug and other serious crime offences (i.e. around 8 officers). This gives a total required capacity of 24 operational constables as against the current establishment of 15 operational posts. It is therefore recommended that, in order to overcome the current weakness in NIM Level 2 capability, the resources of the Drug Squad are increased by 9 constable posts.
- 6.36 Assuming that the resources of the Drug Squad are increased, the unit will still be required to support major incident investigations. However, increased resilience would mean that, demands permitting, the unit would still retain some operational capability even when major incidents were ongoing.
- 6.37 Previous sections of this report have outlined the impact which abstracting staff to major incidents has on the overall performance of the Force. Proposals have been developed to help reduce this impact by implementing a team of permanent HOLMES Indexers. The option to implement a team of dedicated major incident investigators was considered but rejected as too resource intensive given the size of the Force and current detective shortages.

6.38 Drug Squad officers are highly experienced detectives and so it is inevitable that they will be called upon to support major incident investigations. It is the conclusion of this review that by increasing the number of operational constables in the Drug Squad up to the proposed level of 24, it would be possible for the unit to provide a set level of officers to support major incident investigations, particularly for Category A incidents. It is suggested that a specific protocol detailing how the resources of the Drug Squad would be used on major incidents be developed.

### **Retaining the Current Multi-Functional Approach**

6.39 Having taken account of the strategic background issues underpinning this review, and the results of consultation and comparison, it has been concluded that there is a convincing case for retaining the current approach of having a single unit of specialist investigators performing a multi-function role in relation to Level 2 operations.

6.40 The key strength of the current approach is that a group of highly skilled police officers can be deployed to a range of different duties, be it a major incident, a surveillance operation or a serious crime investigation.

6.41 This flexibility is critically important given the relatively small size of the Force and represents an effective use of resources. By maintaining the essential structure of the Drug Squad, the Force retains the tactical capabilities of a very highly skilled and productive unit of officers, i.e. it continues to derive benefits from a structure that is known to work.

6.42 Although this review has concluded that the Force's overall approach to the provision of surveillance and specialist investigatory skills continues to be correct, but that the title of 'Force Drugs Squad' is somewhat inaccurate because it does not represent the full range of work undertaken by the unit. As such, it is recommended that the Squad is re-titled as the Drugs and Serious Crime Group, thereby reflecting the fact that the unit will be tasked to undertake any appropriate crime operations. However, the unit will retain a primary remit to tackle Level 2 NIM drug dealers.

6.43 The operational priorities of the Drug and Serious Crime Group would be set by the Force Tactical Tasking and Co-ordinating Group: its deployment would be NIM driven; regularly reviewed; and directed towards a variety of identified Level 2 problems. The Group will therefore have a very close working relationship with the Field Intelligence Officers in the Force Intelligence Bureau.

## Technical Support Unit

- 6.44 In undertaking its surveillance role, the Drug Squad is currently the main user of technical surveillance equipment in the Force. As such, it is considered that it would be beneficial if line management responsibility for the Technical Support Unit (TSU) transfers from the Force Intelligence Bureau to the Head of the Drug and Serious Crime Group

### Key Recommendations

<b>Recommendation 2</b>
<b>The Force should retain its current approach of operating with a centrally based team of police officers performing a multi-functional role in relation to drug related crime, surveillance and major incident investigations. However, the Drug Squad should be re-titled as the Drug and Serious Crime Group to better reflect its role in dealing with NIM Level 2 criminality.</b>

- 6.45 The expected benefits of this recommendation are as follows:

- The operation of a centrally based team of specialist police officers provides the most pragmatic and sustainable approach to service provision for a Force the size of Bedfordshire;
- Re-titling the unit at the Drugs and Serious Crime Group better reflects the nature of work undertaken but emphasises that it still retains a focus on tackling drug dealing;
- The Drug and Serious Crime Group would effectively operate as a key element of the Force's NIM Level 2 capability and would undertake operations in all priority areas;
- Closely aligning the work of the Drug and Serious Crime Group with the Force Tasking and Tactical Co-ordination Group would mean an end to self-tasking, it would integrate the work of the unit with the priorities of the Force, and it would provide a transparent process for determining operational priorities.

<b>Recommendation 3</b>
<b>The Force should expand the operational capacity of the Drug and Serious Crime Group by increasing the number of constable posts by nine, thereby giving 25 centrally-based operational constable posts in total</b>
<b>(Note:</b> these additional posts would be provided from police posts released as a result of the Force's 2004/05 civilianisation programme and not through police establishment growth).

### Benefits of this Recommendation

6.46 The expected benefits of this recommendation are as follows:

- The Drug and Serious Crime Group would have the ability to resource and sustain mobile surveillance operations NIM Level 2 target criminals;
- Increasing the resource base of the Drug and Serious Crime Group would provide a practical and efficient way to address the identified area of weakness in terms of the provision of NIM Level 2 capability;
- The increased resources of the unit would enable the Drug and Serious Crime Group to provide improved support to major incident investigations whilst still retaining an ability to support other ongoing operations;
- The Drug and Serious Crime Group would continue to operate with expertise in relation to drug offences and would be able to provide ongoing support to frontline staff in areas such as testing recovered samples or in providing expert statements;
- The increased capability of the Drug and Serious Crime Group would provide more opportunities to deploy their skills in supporting NIM Level 1 operations against prolific offenders.

6.47 Increasing the resources of the Drug and Serious Crime Group will increase its capacity by some 56%. This increased capacity provides the opportunity for potential future efficiency gains estimated at £410k p.a.

### **Progress Against the Recommendation**

6.48 It is published HMIC best practice for forces to 'fast-track' the implementation of recommendations where this would bring about a rapid improvement in service or address identified problem areas.

6.49 In February 2004, the Police Authority approved the 2004/05 budget, which included a £730k civilianisation programme designed to release 34 police officer posts for allocation to other duties. The nine additional constable posts required by this recommendation have been identified as priority posts to be filled as a result of this civilianisation.

- 6.50 Although the recommended nine posts have no direct cost implications for the organisation, the opportunity cost of these posts equates to £324k p.a., i.e. although not establishment growth, these police posts could have been utilised for other frontline policing roles.
- 6.51 The nine posts have now been advertised in-Force with selection due to take place during June 2004. Once successful candidates have been appointed the release of officers from their existing posts to take up these new roles will be carefully managed so as to minimise the impact on other parts of the organisation and to fit with the civilianisation process.
- 6.52 An integral part of the Force's best value methodology is a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) monitoring process which tracks the progress of implementation of agreed recommendations and assesses the extent to which expected and anticipated benefits are actually delivered. Results of this monitoring are regularly reported to the Police Authority.

### **Management Action Recommendations**

- 6.53 The Q Division Management Team should:
- (i) develop a protocol to show how the resources of the expanded Drug and Serious Crime Group will be used as investigators to support various categories of major incidents;
  - (ii) develop a process to utilise the specialist skills of the Drug and Serious Crime Group in liaising with and supporting officers on territorial divisions in dealing with drug offences, this might include introducing Drug Liaison Officers;
  - (iii) should transfer the line management responsibility for the Technical Support Unit from the Force Intelligence Bureau and incorporate it within the management structure of the Drug and Serious Crime Group;
  - (iv) examine the potential benefits of civilianising the Chemist Inspection Officer post and of incorporating that function within the Community Safety Department, working alongside the Force Drugs Co-ordinator.


## 7.0 FRAUD SQUAD

### Overview

7.1 The Fraud Squad is a specialist unit, based at Luton Police Station, that undertakes investigations into economic crimes in three main areas:

- (i) Cheque and Plastic Card Unit (CPCU): Representing the main volume of the work of the Squad, the CPCU work closely with territorial divisions in dealing with all thefts of cheque books and payment cards within Bedfordshire and the subsequent fraudulent use of stolen cheques and of stolen/compromised/counterfeit cards;
- (ii) Fraud Investigation Unit: Fraud investigations are undertaken by specially trained and experienced detectives/investigators who focus their efforts on complex and high value frauds. It is in the nature of these offences that evidence gathering is often very protracted and cases require investigators to be skilled in preparing files for Court;
- (iii) Financial Investigations Unit: Financial Investigations are either undertaken either proactively for people suspected or having committed criminal offences or reactively for people convicted of criminal offences. Financial investigations are normally undertaken to support other ongoing criminal investigations or as a result of referrals to the police by other agencies.

7.2 The organisation and staffing of the Fraud Squad is outlined in the **Figure 10** below:



## Focus of Effort of the Fraud Squad

- 7.3 This review has sought to assess the extent to which the focus of effort/use of resources within the Fraud Squad matches with the main needs of the organisation. This process has been driven by a number of factors including:
- (i) The desire to improve the outcomes which the Squad produces in directly supporting frontline policing performance;
  - (ii) To ensure the Force is well placed to make best use of new powers provided under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA);
  - (iii) To consider the impact of problems experienced in recruiting and retaining detectives as specialist fraud investigators;
  - (iv) To examine the relationship between the work of the Squad and hi-tech crime investigations, many of which contain a financial element.
- 7.4 In terms of policing priorities and performance measures, fraud does not currently feature as an objective crime, i.e. it is not used as a key measure of effective policing performance. However, the Home Office National Policing Plan (2004 –2007) stresses the importance of using financial investigation as a tool to tackle both organised and serious crime, and business related crime.
- 7.5 Despite this comparatively low profile nationally, the Force still needs to put in place an adequate response to the range of different fraud offences. However, the Force does have the ability to choose where the focus of effort should be and to deploy its resources accordingly.
- 7.6 In line with the strategic issues driving this review, internal consultation showed strong support for the view that the work of the Fraud Squad should be orientated to more directly support frontline policing performance. This review has identified two areas where the focus on frontline performance can be improved:
- Developing the capability of the Cheque and Plastic Card Unit (CPCU);
  - Making best use of POCA powers in support of NIM and targeted policing.

## Cheque and Plastic Card Unit

- 7.7 Experience nationally has shown that organised credit card fraud is often linked to other forms of serious crime, such as drug dealing. These offences also have a major impact on the business community. A number of high-profile cases have also demonstrated that credit card fraud is a key route for generating funds to support terrorism.
- 7.8 Analysis in Bedfordshire has shown that cheque and plastic card offences are often associated with other forms of acquisitive crimes, particularly domestic burglary, e.g. credit cards obtained in a burglary get passed on and are then used to fraudulently obtain goods which are sold to support a drug habit. As such, making an impact on cheque and plastic card crimes provides opportunities for crime reduction across a range of different target offences.
- 7.9 Cheque and payment card offences represent the vast majority of economic crimes and such offences are growing at a significant rate. Plastic card offences alone cost the UK economy £425 million during 2002, with significant national increases in offences of fraudulent possession (up 15%), identify theft (up 41%) and Internet fraud (up 86%). The number of credit cards in use within the UK has increased dramatically over recent years and is predicted to top 90 million by 2010.
- 7.10 During 2002/03, Bedfordshire recorded some 1,900 cheque and credit card offences with transactions totalling over £200,000. The Cheque and Plastic Card Unit (CPCU) investigated these offences and prepared approximately 50 intelligence/arrest packages with named offenders. These arrest packages covered some 350 cheque offences and 54 credit card offences.
- 7.11 Successful detection of cheque and plastic card offences makes a direct contribution to the performance of the Force in two ways:
- Through identifying and arresting offenders, high volumes of secondary detections can be generated because each act of fraudulent use is counted as a separate crime;
  - Through intelligence analysis and cultivating informants, primary offenders and organised groups of criminals engaged in plastic card fraud can be identified and their activities disrupted.

## Whole Service Approach

- 7.12 The resources available to the CPCU determine the extent to which it is able to engage in arresting offenders or whether it simply prepares intelligence/arrest packages that get passed back to frontline officers to execute.
- 7.13 Currently the CPCU operates with two Detective Constable posts and so has a limited ability to provide a prisoner handling function. As a result, a significant number of the intelligence packages developed are referred back to the territorial divisions. This referral approach has two main weaknesses:
- The general lack of a proactive investigative capacity on the territorial divisions, primarily resulting from major incident abstractions, means that arrest packages are not always promptly actioned and so detection opportunities are missed;
  - There is a failure to maximise the use of the specialist skills and knowledge developed by CPCU investigators, which in turn weakens the intelligence gathering cycle and potentially means that opportunities for primary detections and the disruption of organised criminal activity are undermined.
- 7.14 Internal consultation undertaken during the review showed strong support for the view that the role of the CPCU should include both intelligence package preparation and offender handling, i.e. that the whole service should be provided in-house within the CPCU.
- 7.15 In order for the CPCU to increase its investigative capacity, and to provide for a degree of resilience during periods of staff abstraction, it is the conclusion of this review that the resources of the CPCU need to be substantially increased. It is therefore recommended that the establishment of the CPCU be increased by the addition of four Constable posts.

## **Fraud Investigations**

- 7.16 Crimes involving fraud and financial offences vary significantly in terms of their seriousness and complexity. Complex fraud investigations need to be undertaken by specially trained staff and cases take up to two years to bring before the Courts.
- 7.17 Officers conducting fraud investigations need excellent case preparation skills because of the sheer volume of evidence that such enquiries generate. However, investigations tend not to be time critical and so case loads can be prioritised and managed.

- 7.18 During 2002/03, Fraud Squad officers conducted a total of 24 fraud investigations. In a number of cases these investigations were undertaken in co-operation with other agencies, e.g. Serious Fraud Office, Department of Work and Pensions or the DTI. Of those investigations concluded during the year, 15 crime detections were generated.
- 7.19 In terms of national trends for the most serious and high value fraud offences, research by professional services firm KPMG<sup>2</sup> showed that the number of such cases more than doubled during 2003, increasing to 153. However, the total value of these frauds almost halved to £374 million. One major reason for the reduced value was a more active and robust approach to the investigation of VAT frauds by the HM Custom and Excise.
- 7.20 The Force maintains a very limited capacity to investigate serious and complex frauds with this function performed by two specially trained Detective Constables. However, in recent periods, providing even this limited fraud investigation capability has proved problematic due to two reasons:
- (i) The abstraction of detectives to support major incident investigations: during 2002/03 one of the two fraud officers was abstracted for more than six months;
  - (ii) Difficulties in retaining trained investigators in-force: both fraud investigation officers recently having transferred to the City of London Police who pay significantly more than Bedfordshire and who can offer development opportunities for officers interested in fraud as a career.
- 7.21 Internal consultation revealed strong support for the need to continue to investigate frauds, particularly for those conducted by individuals in positions of trust, such as solicitors or charity organisers. Equally, the Force is committed to a number of memoranda of understanding with other agencies that have an investigatory role in relation to fraud.
- 7.22 Set against this background of continuing demand and a commitment to work in partnership with other agencies, it is the conclusion of this review that the Force should continue to provide a central fraud investigation capacity, ideally provided in-house by suitably trained investigators.

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<sup>2</sup> *KPMG Fraud Barometer research published in July 2003*

## Buying-in Fraud Investigation Services

- 7.23 In response to the difficulties experienced in maintaining a fraud investigation capacity, Q Division has recently experimented with buying-in expertise from a specialist private sector organisation. The external supplier has been able to provide retired police officers who are highly experienced fraud investigators.
- 7.24 This experiment in buying-in support proved to be very successful, providing a flexible and cost-effective solution to cover periods of staffing shortages. Although not an ideal solution, it is likely that this need to buy-in services will continue in the short-term and, as such, it is recommended that the Q Division Management make suitable budgetary provision.

## **Proceeds of Crime Act and Financial Investigations**

- 7.25 Financial Investigations are increasingly a core part of the investigative process. For example, an investigation into someone's financial background is now a common line of enquiry in many major incident investigations.
- 7.26 Developments in intelligence-led policing, combined with an increased requirement on financial institutions to report suspicious transactions to the police, had led to a significant increase in financial investigations undertaken proactively in order to determine if monies are being generated as a result of criminal activity.
- 7.27 As evidence of this increasing demand, the Fraud Squad undertook 206 financial investigations during 2002/03 compared to just 135 during 2001/02. During 2002/03, external agencies also disclosed details of some 224 potentially suspicious transactions.
- 7.28 The Force has been steadily developing its Financial Investigation capacity using a combination of both officers and police staff. All Financial Investigators need to be specially trained and accredited by the Asset Recovery Agency in order to perform their roles.
- 7.29 Added to this general background of increasing demand, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) has recently come into effect and provides the police with the power to recover assets/monies acquired through any form of criminal activity. Under the initial POCA scheme the Home Office has set a national asset recovery target of £40m for Forces in England and Wales. If this target is exceeded then the Home Office will consider a pro-rata redistribution of a significant percentage of monies over that threshold back to those forces which made the initial recovery.

- 7.30 The advent of POCA has the potential to provide the Force with what is effectively a new and powerful means through which to target criminals, disrupt activity and reduce crime, i.e. by taking away the financial benefits which offenders accrue through crime.
- 7.31 The real challenge for the Force is to ensure that the POCA approach gets incorporated into core frontline policing. In order to maximise the potential benefits of POCA, this review has concluded that the Financial Investigation Unit needs to develop systems and approaches in two key areas:
- A reactive capability to directly support frontline officers in maximising opportunities for recovering monies and assets from offenders brought before the Courts, i.e. adding value post-arrest;
  - A proactive capability that is driven by and operates in line with NIM priorities to target high profile and prolific offenders, i.e. where the financial investigation is a core aspect of intelligence gathering and/or POCA powers are used as an operational tactic to disrupt crime and to remove assets.
- 7.32 Given that POCA powers have only recently come into being, the Force is still developing its approach. A critical part of this process will be the need for ongoing communication between the Financial Investigations Unit and officers on territorial divisions, particularly in getting POCA to integrate with the local operation of NIM.
- 7.33 It is the conclusion of this review that the potential benefits offered by POCA will only be realised if the Force re-focuses its existing financial investigation capacity to specifically target the monies and assets acquired by offenders. This will require the Financial Investigation Unit to concentrate its effort on the 'reactive' aspects of its work as a priority over proactive investigations.
- 7.34 It is therefore recommended that the work of the Financial Investigation Unit be re-focused on aspects of asset confiscation, thereby supporting frontline policing by utilising POCA to deal with offenders arrested/convicted for acquisitive crimes. However, some financial investigation capacity should continue to be utilised to support investigations at NIM Level 2 and to deal with referrals made to the Force.
- 7.35 It is also recommended that the Force should seek to develop a business case for further increasing its financial investigation capacity (using a combination of both police officer and police staff resources). The eventual aim should be to provide a financial investigation capacity within the Intelligence Unit of each territorial division.

## High Tech Crime

7.36 The Force currently has a Home Office funded post dedicated to undertaking hi-tech crime investigations: this post currently sits within the FIB as a part of the Sensitive Policing Unit. This review considered whether there would be benefits in incorporating this hi-tech crime role within the Fraud Squad given that many hi-tech crimes involve a financial element.


7.37 An examination of the workload of the hi-tech crime investigator role revealed that the primary focus of activity was in two areas:

- (i) Investigations into paedophile activity on the Internet;
- (ii) Forensic examinations of computer equipment seized during criminal investigations.

7.38 Although some of the hi-tech crime investigations undertaken have involved aspects of fraud, this was not a core part of the workload demand. Given this background and the ongoing nature of anti-paedophile operations, it was concluded that this post should remain within the structure of the Sensitive Policing Unit.

## Economic Crime Unit

7.39 The main thrust of the recommendations made in relation to the operation of the Fraud Squad are designed to provide for a clearer alignment of priorities with frontline policing activity. The proposed change actually represents a decision to strategically shift the focus of effort away from complex fraud investigations towards other aspects of economic crime. This shift is highlighted in **Figure 11** below:



7.40 In order to give a clear indication of the shift in emphasis of the work of the Fraud Squad it is recommended that the function be re-titled as the 'Economic Crime Unit'. This Unit would focus on cheque and plastic card offences and on POCA related activity: both areas where the unit can deliver improved value and performance in support of frontline policing.

### Key Recommendations

<b>Recommendation 4</b>
<p><b>The Cheque and Plastic Card Unit should undertake both an intelligence gathering and offender-handling role. In order to provide this extended level of service, the resources of the Unit should be increased by four constable posts.</b></p> <p><b>(Note:</b> these additional posts would be provided from police posts released as a result of the Force's 2004/05 civilianisation programme and not through police establishment growth).</p>

### Benefits of this Recommendation

7.41 The expected benefits of this recommendation are as follows:

- The CPCU will provide a complete in-house service in terms of dealing with cheque and plastic card offences, removing this workload from territorial divisions;
- The total number of offences detected will be increased because there will be sufficient resources to maintain a continual focus on the investigation;
- The quality of intelligence generated will be improved because there will be direct feedback from the investigating officers to the intelligence/analysis staff;
- Increased likelihood of identifying links between cheque and plastic card offences and other forms of organised crime.

7.42 Increasing the resources of the Cheque and Plastic Unit will increase its capacity of the Fraud Squad of by some 40%. This increased capacity provides the opportunity for potential future efficiency gains estimated at £135k p.a.

### Progress Against the Recommendation

7.43 It is published HMIC best practice for forces to 'fast-track' the implementation of recommendations where this would bring about a rapid improvement in service or address identified problem areas.

- 7.44 In February 2004, the Police Authority approved the 2004/05 budget, which included a £730k civilianisation programme designed to release 34 police officer posts for allocation to other duties. The four additional constable posts required by this recommendation have been identified as priority posts to be filled as a result of this civilianisation.
- 7.45 Although this recommendation has no direct additional costs for the organisation, the opportunity cost of these four posts equates to £144k p.a., i.e. although not establishment growth, these police posts could have been utilised for other frontline policing roles.
- 7.46 The four constable posts have recently been advertised in-Force with applications invited by the end of June 2004. Once successful candidates have been identified, the release of officers from their existing posts to take up these new roles will be carefully managed so as to minimise the impact on other parts of the organisation.

<b>Recommendation 5</b>
<b>The Force should re-focus its financial investigation processes to give more emphasis to reactive investigations arising from arrests/convictions and so maximise opportunities presented by the Proceeds of Crime Act.</b>

#### Benefits of this Recommendation

- 7.47 The expected benefits of this recommendation are as follows:
- An increase in the number of occasions that POCA powers are used to confiscate monies and assets acquired through criminal activity;
  - An increase in the amount of monies seized through asset confiscation orders.
- 7.48 An integral part of the Force's best value methodology is a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) monitoring process which tracks the progress of implementation of agreed recommendations and assesses the extent to which expected and anticipated benefits are actually delivered. Results of this monitoring are regularly reported to the Police Authority.

## **Management Action Recommendations**

7.49 The Q Division Management Team should:

- (i) rename the Fraud Squad as the Economic Crime Unit in order to reflect better its full range of responsibilities and to emphasise the increased focus on cheque and plastic card offences, and the application of POCA powers;
- (ii) make suitable budgetary provision for buying-in specialist fraud investigation skills to cover the period until the Force has a full establishment of trained fraud investigators;
- (iii) develop a business case setting out the costs and benefits of expanding the Force's financial investigation capacity so as to potentially provide a suitably trained member of staff (police officer or police staff) in the Intelligence Unit on each of the territorial Divisions.

## 8.0 SCIENTIFIC SERVICES

### Overview

- 8.1 The role of the Scientific Services Department is to apply forensic processes and techniques in order to secure identification and elimination evidence to support the investigation of crime. The Department has three main sections:


Scenes of Crime Unit – this unit’s role is to manage the retrieval of fingerprint, photographic and forensic evidence from crime scenes and then to route these retrievals through the appropriate process in order to maximise opportunities to identify offenders.

Fingerprint Bureau - the role of the Bureau is to provide a comprehensive ‘ten-print’ fingerprint identification service for marks recovered from crime scenes or marks recovered as a result of chemical treatments.

Imagery Unit – responsible for chemical treatments, operating the mini-lab system for developing photographic films, providing a photographic service for major crime scenes and providing a service in viewing, editing and copying video and CCTV images.

### Structure and Staffing

- 8.2 The structure of the Scientific Services Department is shown in **Figure 12** below:



## **The Increasing Importance of Scientific Investigation**

- 8.3 Developments in forensic techniques mean that scientific investigation is now a core aspect of the evidence gathering process. In order to maximise the contribution that scientific investigation can make to the performance of the Force, sufficient resources need to be available to attend and examine appropriate crime scenes in order to retrieve marks and samples.
- 8.4 Recent figures show that approximately 14% of the Force's total detected crime can be directly attributed to the evidential value of crime scene identifications (both fingerprint and DNA identifications).
- 8.5 Internal consultation undertaken during this review showed the frontline staff viewed Scientific Services as the most important services provided by Q Division. There was very strong consensus across all parts of the organisation that the Force needed to continue to invest resources in developing its forensic capability and that the future aim should be to operate a 'round-the-clock' service to support frontline policing.
- 8.6 Staff on territorial Divisions also felt that the services provided by the Scientific Services Department should be tailored to reflect current crime priorities as defined through NIM. This would require an increased 'customer' focus with processes and priorities orientated to reflect local need.

## **Fingerprint Bureau Performance**

- 8.7 The Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO) continually measures the performance all Fingerprint Bureaux in making effective usage of the National Automated Fingerprint Identification System (NAFIS). Since September 2001, Bedfordshire's performance has been steadily improving and it is now consistently ranked as one of the top 5 best performing in England and Wales. This improvement in NAFIS performance has also been reflected in a rising number of identifications up from 773 in 2001/02 to 909 during 2002/03.
- 8.8 During the last two years a great deal of effort has been put into improving the quality of the processes and standards operated by the Fingerprint Bureau. This has been accompanied by an increased focus on performance management. The Bureau has recently successfully applied for ISO9001-2000 accreditation.

## **Policing Standard Unit Review of the Scientific Services Department**

- 8.9 Prior to the commencement of this best value review, the Force had already commissioned an independent appraisal of the operation of the Scientific Services Department. This project was carried out in conjunction with the Home Office Policing Standards Unit with the review conducted by an expert from the Forensic Science Service.
- 8.10 This Policing Standards Unit review was an in-depth examination of practices and procedures designed to identify opportunities to improve performance in all aspects of the scientific services function, particularly the frontline service provided by SOCOs. The review generated some 25 detailed recommendations covering four main areas:
- (i) Increasing service provision and scene attendance by increasing the number of SOCOs;
  - (ii) Developing improved tasking procedures for SOCOs;
  - (iii) Improving systems for performance management across the Department;
  - (iv) Streamlining and improving the systems for laboratory submissions.
- 8.11 The outcomes from the Policing Standards Unit review served as the catalyst for a major change programme, actions from which are still being implemented. These changes have included the civilianisation of SOCO posts, new arrangements for DNA submissions, accommodation changes, skill development for staff, and the recruitment of a Scientific Services Manager. The full impact of these changes in terms of improved service and performance will not be realised until 2004/05.
- 8.12 The Force has already identified that further performance improvements still need to be made in terms of generating the best possible return from the ongoing investment in scientific services. In particular, future effort will be concentrated on improving the conversion rate of identifications (i.e. DNA and fingerprint hits) into positive outcomes (i.e. crime detections and eliminations). Instilling this dimension of performance management is critical in order to improve the support given to frontline policing.

## Review of SOCO Demands and Shift Patterns

- 8.13 In response to one of the recommendations made in the Policing Standards Unit review, Q Division management commissioned the Force's Business Management Department to undertake an examination of SOCO demands and shift patterns. Completed in May 2003, this review identified that in order to operate a shift pattern that reasonably reflects SOCO workload demand, the Force needed to increase the number of SOCO posts from 24 to 28.

## Posts Funded under the DNA Expansion Fund

- 8.14 In 2000 the Home Office introduced direct funding to forces under the DNA Expansion Funding. Between 2000 and 2004 some £182 million has been provided to forces in order to increase the number DNA samples and profiles held on the National DNA Database with the eventual aim of holding profiles on all known active offenders.
- 8.15 Bedfordshire has benefited from funding under the scheme and currently receives direct support for six Scenes of Crime Officer posts, three Forensic Intelligence Clerks, one DNA Performance Manager and one DNA Administration Clerk.
- 8.16 Although the continuation of DNA expansion funding has been guaranteed for 2004/05, the Force would not be able to maintain the current level of scientific service if the financial support for these 11 posts was withdrawn in the future. Loss or reduction in funding would either result in a reduction in service provision or would require the Police Authority to increase the budget to make-up the shortfall.
- 8.17 Full replacement for the current level of funding received under the DNA expansion fund would require a budget increase in the order of £280K p.a. Given the likelihood of a tight round of government spending for 2005/06, the possibility of a reduction in direct funding in this area is a real future risk and one about which the Police Authority should be cognisant.

## Key Recommendations

Recommendation 6
<b>The Force should further develop its forensic science capability by increasing the number of SOCO posts from the current level of 24 up to 28 posts.</b>

- 8.18 Budget growth is required for recommendation six in order to fund four additional police staff Scenes of Crime Officers. It is estimated that this will cost c. £89k p.a.

## Benefits of this Recommendation

- 8.19 The expected benefits of this recommendation are as follows:
- An improved level of service provided to victims of crime;
  - An improved level of service to support the frontline investigation of volume crime;
  - An increase in the total number of crime scenes attended in line with the agreed attendance policy for different offence types;
  - An increased in the number of crime scene marks recovered for autocrime offences (an area which currently suffered because of a lack of frontline SOCO resources).
- 8.20 Increasing the number of Scenes of Crime Officers will increase its capacity of the Scientific Services Department by around 16%. This increased capacity provides the opportunity for potential future efficiency gains estimated at £290k p.a.
- 8.21 An integral part of the Force's best value methodology is a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) monitoring process which tracks the progress of implementation of agreed recommendations and assesses the extent to which expected and anticipated benefits are actually delivered. Results of this monitoring are regularly reported to the Police Authority.

## **Progress Against the Recommendation**

- 8.22 It is published HMIC best practice for forces to 'fast-track' the implementation of recommendations where this would bring about a rapid improvement in service or address identified problem areas.
- 8.23 The recommendation to increase the number of frontline SOCO posts was recognised as a priority issue at the 'emerging findings' stage of the review. Given that implementation required the establishment of new posts, a growth item was included in the 2004/05 budget proposals. The Police Authority gave approval for this funding in February 2004. The selection process for these posts is now completed with staff commencing in July 2004.

## **Management Action Recommendations**

- 8.24 The Q Division Management Team should introduce a service level agreement between the Scientific Services Department and territorial divisions that, within an overall corporate framework, would enable forensic science services to be tailored to reflect the NIM Control Strategy priorities of each division.

## 9.0 FORCE INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

### Overview

9.1 The Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB) is responsible for providing a wide range of specialist intelligence and analysis functions designed to support operational policing, provide co-ordination and information sharing across the Force, and manage the exchange of intelligence with other police organisations nationally and internationally.

9.2 The FIB has four main functional units as outlined below:

Intelligence Development Unit: - Responsible for research and field intelligence activity to developing NIM Level 2 intelligence packages, for liaison with the prison service on intelligence matters and the release of potentially dangerous offenders.

Intelligence Analysis Unit: - Established as part of the NIM Project, the unit undertakes NIM Level 2 assessments and analysis, and co-ordinates the operation of NIM Level 1 assessments across the Force.


Sensitive Policing Unit: - This Unit undertakes a broad range on duties including the administration of surveillance applications required under RIPA legislation and risk assessments of sex and dangerous offenders. The Unit also undertakes high tech crime investigations, technical support to operations, witness protection, and a central service for private sector telephony and subscriber information.

Firearms Licensing Section - Recently incorporated within the structure of the FIB, the Firearms Licensing Section is responsible for managing and administering all firearms licensing matters within the Force area. This includes new applications, renewals and making home visits (this function has been reviewed separately from the rest of the FIB – see section 14 of this report).

### Structure and Staffing

9.3 A Detective Chief Inspector role has recently been created to lead the work of the Force Intelligence Bureau. This post holder will also act of the Force's Deputy Director of Intelligence. The structure and staffing of the Force Intelligence Bureau in outlined in **Figure 13** below.

**Figure 13: Force Intelligence Bureau Structure & Staffing at 31/03/04**



## Recent Service Developments

9.4 The FIB plays a central role in the operation of the National Intelligence Model within the Force, most especially in terms of developing and assessing issues at NIM Level 2. NIM processes and procedures are continuing to develop but benefits are already being derived in terms of improved working relationship with divisional intelligence units. The target date for full implementation of NIM was April 2004.

9.5 Appointments to the newly created Intelligence Analysts posts were only made during the second half on 2003 and since that time staff have had to undertake significant training and skills development. These staff will be responsible for delivering a range of intelligence products including:

- Crime and incident pattern analysis;
- Prolific offender profiling;
- Hot-spot identification.

- 9.6 All functions and activities of the Intelligence Analysis Unit will be subject to evaluation as a part of the formal post-implementation review of the NIM project.
- 9.7 The structure of the Sensitive Policing Unit (SPU) was implemented in October 2002. During its first year of operation the Unit has focused on developing processes to ensure that the Force fully complies with authorisation requirements of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA). Internal consultation undertaken as a part of this review showed that the service provided in this area was very highly rated by officers across the Force.
- 9.8 Other priorities for the Sensitive Policing Unit have included:
- Developing processes and procedures to act as the single point of contact for all telecommunications enquiries (e.g. subscriber checks, billing enquires, tracing). This has been a major area of growth over recent years, particularly with the increased use of mobile phones by organised criminal gangs;
  - Investigations into suspected cases of paedophilia on the Internet as a part of the national initiative, Operation Ore.

### **Intelligence Development Unit and Field Intelligence Officers**

- 9.9 Field Intelligence Officers (FIOs) work in the Intelligence Development Unit and have a primary role to research and develop intelligence packages on NIM Level 2 crime and target criminals. Although not surveillance trained, these officers do undertake static observations and undertake sensitive enquiries and research as a core part of their role.
- 9.10 Given that NIM has only recently been fully implemented, the Force is still developing its approach in relation to Level 2 criminality. In particular, the Level 2 Control Strategy is now in place which identifies priority areas for action in relation to cross-border and serious crime issues. The priority areas in the Level 2 Control Strategy are as follows:
- (i) Domestic Burglary;
  - (ii) Violent Crime (domestic violence, homicide, robbery, wounding, hate crime, vulnerable child victims and terrorism);
  - (iii) Vehicle Crime;
  - (iv) Repetitious Demand;
  - (v) Drug Supply.

9.11 The processes which the Force uses to determine its Level 2 priorities and to make choices over which targets and operations to conduct is now also in place. This prioritisation role is undertaken by the Force Tasking and Tactical Co-ordinating Group, a multi-disciplinary body that is chaired by the Assistant Chief Constable.

9.12 This Group has a range of potential operational tactics and resources that can be deployed to address an identified problem, e.g. high profile policing to disrupt activity or the use of mobile surveillance against a particular target criminal or organised group.

9.13 Internal consultation undertaken for this review has highlighted that the Force currently lacks the ability to adopt and sustain a robust approach to dealing with Level 2 criminality. This same concern was highlighted in a recent evaluation of the Force's overall approach to NIM undertaken during November 2003 by the National ACPO NIM Project Team. This weakness in terms of the Force's Level 2 approach has two particular and related dimensions:

(i) Limited FIO capacity within the Intelligence Development Unit

This problem restricts the ability to develop intelligence packages and tactical assessments for Level 2 target criminals. This situation has been compounded by the fact that during the last 12 months the availability of FIOs has been severely restricted by the abstraction of staff to support major incident investigations. Delays have also been encountered in training newly appointed FIOs.

(ii) Limited availability of specialist resources

This problem relates to the limited ability of the Force to deploy specialist resources as a tactical option to address a particular Level 2 assessment. The main areas of weakness highlighted in this area are surveillance capability and technical support. The impact of this problem is that it restricts the range of tactical options available to the Force, limits the number of operations that can be undertaken at any one time and limits the period over which such operations can be sustained.

9.14 In implementing NIM, the Force has committed itself to adopting a proactive and intelligence-led approach to policing. However, the two problems highlighted above are severely restricting the Force's ability to put in to practice effectively its plans for tackling Level 2 criminality.

- 9.15 It is seen as critical that the momentum that NIM has created at BCU level is carried through to tackling complex and serious crime issues at Level 2. That can only be achieved if quality intelligence is submitted, tactical options are assessed and an appropriate response is then put in place.
- 9.16 The issue of surveillance capacity has already been considered in Section 6 of this report and recommendations have been made in relation to the future role and resources of the Force Drugs Squad. This resource availability problem has been compounded by the lack of an effective Technical Support Unit (TSU) function, which has it self been restricted by staffing shortages. However, the recent appointment of new staff, combined with planned investment in new equipment mean that this TSU problem is now being addressed.
- 9.17 The ongoing FIO capacity problem means that the Force currently does not have the ability to effectively develop and maintain live intelligence profiles on Level 2 target criminals and, similarly, that it lacks the ability to fully consider the range of tactical options to address identified problems. Both of these aspects are important because both impact on the quality of decision making made by the Tactical Tasking and Co-ordinating Group, i.e. has that Group got the information it needs to enable it to make the best 'investment decision' in terms of deploying specialist resources.
- 9.18 It is the conclusion of this review that, in order for the Force to develop an effective approach to Level 2 criminality, the FIO resources of the Force Intelligence Bureau must be increased. The roles that FIOs perform must allow them to support practical application of the NIM Level 2 Control Strategy and also to provide appropriate support to major incident investigation.

### **Key Recommendations**

<b>Recommendation 7</b>
<p><b>The Force should increase its capacity to deal with NIM Level 2 criminality by creating three additional Detective Constable Field Intelligence Officer posts in the Force Intelligence Bureau.</b></p> <p><b>(Note:</b> these additional posts would be provided from police posts released as a result of the Force's 2004/05 civilianisation programme and not through police establishment growth).</p>

## Benefits of this Recommendation

9.19 The expected benefits of this recommendation are as follows:

- An increased ability to track, monitor, research and target priority crime areas identified in the Force's Level 2 Control Strategy;
- An increase in the number of Level 2 intelligence packages submitted for consideration to the Force Tasking and Tactical Co-ordinating Group;
- Improved quality of intelligence assessment to support Level 2 operations;
- Improved ability to support the intelligence requirements of major incidents

9.20 An integral part of the Force's best value methodology is a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) monitoring process which tracks the progress of implementation of agreed recommendations and assesses the extent to which expected and anticipated benefits are actually delivered. Results of this monitoring are regularly reported to the Police Authority.

## **Progress Against the Recommendation**

9.21 It is published HMIC best practice for forces to 'fast-track' the implementation of recommendations where this would bring about a rapid improvement in service or address identified problem areas.

9.22 In February 2004, the Police Authority approved the 2004/05 budget, which included a £730k civilianisation programme designed to release 34 police officer posts for allocation to other duties. The three additional posts required by this recommendation have been identified as priority posts to be filled as a result of this civilianisation. These posts will be advertised in the near future with the intention to bring people into post in September 2004.

9.23 Although this recommendation has no direct cost implications for the organisation the opportunity cost of these three posts equates to £108k p.a., i.e. although not establishment growth, these police posts could have been utilised for other frontline policing roles.


## **Management Action Recommendations**

9.24 The Q Division Management Team should align the responsibilities in individual Field Intelligence Officers with the five priorities in the NIM Level 2 Control Strategy.

## 10.0 CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEPARTMENT

### Overview

- 10.1 The Criminal Justice Department (CJD) provides a central point for liaison and policy development on all matters relating to the administration of justice in Bedfordshire. This includes all aspects of law, procedures, custody policy, new legislation and key criminal justice developments such as 'Narrowing the Justice Gap' and the Case Progression Pilot Scheme.
- 10.2 The CJD enjoys very close working relationships with the Divisional Case Units, which are managed as a part of the territorial divisional structure. The CJD acts as a point of expertise and advice in supporting the day to day work of Divisional Case Units.
- 10.3 The structure and staffing of the CJD is shown in **Figure 14** below.



### Internal Management Review of the Criminal Justice Department

- 10.4 In February 2003, the Force Executive commissioned an internal management review of the Community Action Department which incorporated within its structure the functions and activities of the CJD.

- 10.5 The main conclusion arising from the internal management review was that the Force lacked resilience in terms of the operation and staffing of the CJD. This was viewed as a strategic weakness given the volume of national and local developments impacting on the criminal justice arena.
- 10.6 As a result of the review, which reported its findings in October 2003, the Force Strategy Board agreed the following changes to the operation of the CJD:
- (i) The Criminal Justice Department to be established as a Department in its own right with a management structure separate from the Community Action Department (but still forming a part of Q Division);
  - (ii) The Criminal Justice Department to be led by a Superintendent with overall strategic responsibility for criminal justice matters;
  - (iii) Proposals to civilianise a Police Inspector post and to create an Administration of Justice Manager post;
  - (iv) Line management responsibility for the Firearms Licensing function to be realigned to the Force Intelligence Bureau.

### **Results of Internal Consultation from the Best Value Review**

- 10.7 The internal management review was still ongoing when consultation for this best value review was being conducted. The key issues to emerge from the best value consultation process were:
- The work of staff in the CJD was very highly rated by divisional managers, custody staff and Divisional Case Unit staff;
  - It was generally felt that the whole criminal justice arena was an area of increasing importance and growing workload. The Police are as keen as other partners to see changes made to criminal justice procedures and so the Force needs to invest resources if it wants to get the changes made that it considers important;
  - There was very broad agreement that CJD staffing levels needed to be increased to enable it to cope with the demands coming from criminal justice reform;

- That consideration should be given to bringing together all relevant criminal justice information (case law, guidance, forms, etc) into a single source accessible via the Force Intranet.
- Opportunities to standardise practices across criminal justice agencies were also highlighted. In particular, it was felt that all Courts in Bedfordshire should have the same technical capability to display CCTV and other relevant video evidence prepared in-force by Video Technicians. Ideally that capability should be for the display using DVD technology.

10.8 It is clear that the issues raised during the internal consultation for this review closely echo the findings of the internal management review. As a result of decisions taken by the Force Strategy Board these issues are now being addressed.

### **Key Recommendations**

10.9 This Review has identified no recommendations of a strategic nature relating to the operation of the Criminal Justice Department (other than those already being addressed through ongoing implementation of the internal management review action plan).

### **Management Action Recommendations**

10.10 The Q Division Management Team should:

- (i) improve the access to criminal justice related information for operational officers. This should include exploring the feasibility of utilising the Force Intranet to create a one-stop-shop for all relevant information.
- (ii) Liaise with the Bedfordshire Local Criminal Justice Board (Criminal Justice Excellence Forum sub-group) to ensure a common format of DVD based video imagery display equipment is in operation at all Courts in the Force area.

## 11.0 CHILD PROTECTION TEAM

### Overview

11.1 The role of the Child Protection Team (CPT) is to investigate all situations of ill treatment of children, including serious physical and sexual assaults as well as cases where the standard of care does not reach reasonable standards. Using definitions detailed in the national guidance *Working Together*, the Child Protection Team examine cases of alleged abuse in four key areas:


- (i) Neglect;
- (ii) Physical abuse;
- (iii) Sexual abuse;
- (iv) Emotional abuse.

11.2 The organisation of the Child Protection Team also incorporates a Serious Sexual Offences Team (SSOT). SSOT officers investigate serious sexual offences where the victim is an adult. Officers in this Team work closely with Divisional Victim Liaison Officers (DVLOs).

11.3 Partnership working is a core aspect of the work of the Child Protection Team. Partnership arrangements are pursued via the countywide Area Child Protection Committee and Adult Protection Committee.

### Structure and Staffing

11.4 The structure and staffing of the Child Protection Team is given in the **Figure 15** below.



## **Victoria Climbié Inquiry**

- 11.5 The Inquiry report into the death of 11-year old Victoria Climbié published in January 2003 contained in excess of 100 recommendations for change relating to the role of the various agencies involved in child protection matters. Of these recommendations, approximately 20 had direct implications for the police service.
- 11.6 Given the importance of the findings of the Climbié Inquiry, the Force Executive commissioned an internal management review to assess the extent to which Bedfordshire Police complied with national best practice in terms of child protection and to develop an action plan to implement the relevant Climbié recommendations. The review and associated action plan were complete by April 2003.
- 11.7 In addition to actions aimed at updating and revising procedures, one key change to arise out of the internal review was the decision to change the structural arrangements for the provision of child protection services in the Force. In particular, the decision was taken to replace the existing Family Protection Investigation Team with a dedicated Child Protection Team. Plans were also agreed to establish an Investigation Support Team to act as the single point of contact and to handle all initial referrals.
- 11.8 Implementation of this new structure took place during September 2003 and was supported by changes to roles and remits both of Q Division staff and DVLO staff based on territorial divisions. Internal consultation undertaken during the review showed a high degree of support for these structural changes and for other issues addressed in the action plan.
- 11.9 Comparisons made with other forces showed that both Leicestershire and Warwickshire Police already operated dedicated Child Protection Teams prior to the Climbié Inquiry and so their structural arrangements have not changed. However, Leicestershire were estimating that they would receive a substantial increase in the number of referrals from other agencies as a result of the Climbié recommendations and so were in the process of preparing a bid for increased resources.
- 11.10 Given that these new Child Protection Team arrangements were only implemented in September 2003 and given that change was introduced specifically to address nationally recommended best practice, the view has been taken that further detailed examination of this service under this best value review would provide no real value.

## **Serious Sexual Offences Team**

11.11 The introduction of the Serious Sexual Offences Team (SSOT) took place alongside the child protection changes. Internal consultation highlighted some degree of concern about the implementation process, in particular, some Divisional Victim Liaison Officers (DVLO) expressed concern in two areas:

- (i) That the core operating hours of the SSOT (0900 to 1700 Monday to Friday) were insufficient to fully support frontline needs;
- (ii) That DVLOs would have an increased workload and be more regularly involved in dealing with the victims of serious sexual assaults, i.e. arranging the medical examination and taking initial details from the victim.

11.12 Although it was recognised that DVLOs would only normally be called upon to provide cover in the evenings and at weekends, some staff felt somewhat inexperienced and vulnerable in performing this revised role. These staff expressed a desire to see more support being provided by the SSOT out-of-hours, perhaps in the form of a telephone advice service accessible via the Call Handling Centre. The Sergeant in charge of the SSOT is now providing this advisory service.

## **Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999**

11.13 Sections 16 and 17 of the Youth Justice & Criminal Evidence Act (YJCE) deal with the interviewing of, and giving of evidence by, vulnerable and intimidated victims and witnesses. Although this legislation has clear implications for the work of the Child Protection Team, there are much broader implications for the organisation as a whole in dealing with victims and witnesses in a whole variety of circumstances.

11.14 This review has recognised the importance of the changes arising from Section 16 and Section 17 of YJCE, particularly in the provision of video interviewing facilities and in terms of training requirements. However, this change is primarily a policy matter that needs to be addressed internally by the Force and, as such, this issue has been excluded from the remit of this best value review.

## **Key Recommendations**

- 11.15 This Review has identified no recommendations of a strategic nature relating to the operation of the Child Protect Team and Serious Sexual Offences Team other than those already being addressed through ongoing implementation of the Victoria Climbié Inquiry recommendations.

## **Management Action Recommendations**

- 11.16 The Q Division Management Team should conduct a post-implementation evaluation of the operation of the SSOT, including the impact on the role and workload of DVLOs. This evaluation should take place after the SSOT has been in operation for 12 months.

## 12.0 COMMUNITY ACTION DEPARTMENT

### Overview

12.1 The Community Action Department (CAD) performs a wide range of functions, all of which relate to the core themes of community cohesion and crime reduction. Effective partnership working is central to much of the work of the Department. CAD plays an important role in the following areas:


- (i) Supporting the work of the Force Executive in terms of policy development activity and national policing issues;
- (ii) Liaising with a range of statutory and non-statutory bodies on issues of common responsibility and/or interest;
- (iii) Day to day responsibility for a range of key strategic issues, including community and race relations, reassurance, crime reduction, and drugs;
- (iv) Representing the interests of the Force on a range of inter-agency forums and partnership bodies;
- (v) Generating income to support the ongoing development of policing services.

12.2 Over recent years, CAD has been involved in taking forward the Force's response in a number of important areas. These have included:

- Crime and disorder legislation;
- Youth Offending Team and Drug Action Team developments;
- Community and Race Relations developments following the Lawrence Inquiry;
- The implementation of a range of community sentences and behaviour orders;
- Developments in challenge funding.

## Structure and Staffing

12.3 The structure and staffing of the Community Action Department is outlined in **Figure 16** below:



## Relationship to Other Reviews

12.4 The agreed terms of reference for this best value review stated that the Community Action Department would be subject to a light-touch examination. This decision was taken due to two main factors:

- The Police Authority Best Value Review programme for 2003/04 included a review of partnership working; a core and fundamental part of the work of the Community Action Department;
- The Force Executive had already commissioned an internal management review of the Community Action Department prior to the commencement of this best value review.

## Results of Internal Consultation on the Role of CAD

12.5 Internal consultation undertaken as a part of this best value review highlighted the following issues relating to the work of the Community Action Department:

- (i) It was identified that the work of CAD staff needed to be targeted towards key outcomes in terms of crime reduction and developing increased community cohesion. It was considered that there had been too much focus on individual projects without a clear overall strategic drive;
- (ii) It was recognised that crime and disorder partnerships were now well established and driven at divisional level rather than through the work of CAD. As such, the role and remit of CAD should be reconsidered;
- (iii) Front-line staff had little awareness of the work undertaken within CAD. The roles of Force Crime Reduction Officer and Drugs Co-ordinator were, however, highly rated;
- (iv) There was a strong view that not all roles within CAD needed to be performed by police officers; particular comment was made about the need for three Inspecting posts within the Department at a time when Inspector numbers in the Force as a whole are under pressure.

### **Internal Management Review of CAD**

12.6 In February 2003, the Force Executive commissioned an internal management review of the Community Action Department, which incorporated within its structure the functions and activities of the Criminal Justice Department.

12.7 The primary finding of the internal management review was the need to re-focus the work of CAD around the key strategic themes of community cohesion and crime reduction. In order to support this re-focus, decisions were made by the Force Strategy Board to re-organise the structure and management of a number of functions and activities. These included:

- (i) To separate out the work on criminal justice issues from CAD by establishing a Criminal Justice Department with its own dedicated management structure;
- (ii) To transfer the responsibility for Special Constabulary and volunteering co-ordination from CAD and to incorporate this within the structure of the Human Resources Department;

- (iii) To retain the three Inspecting posts with each one holding a strategic portfolio (crime reduction, drugs co-ordination, community and race relations);
- (iv) To reorganise line management for the role of the Crime Policy Unit with this reporting directly to the Head of Q Division;
- (v) To realign resources and arrangements for corporate policy making.

12.8 It is clear that the issues raised during the internal consultation for this best value review closely echo the drivers for change emerging from the internal management review. It is the conclusion of this review that the decisions taken by the Force Strategy Board satisfactorily address the issues identified during internal consultation for this best value review.

### **Key Recommendations**

12.9 This Review has identified no recommendations of a strategic nature relating to the operation of the Community Action Department.

### **Management Action Recommendations**

12.10 This Review has identified no recommendations for management action other than those already being addressed through ongoing implementation of the internal management review action plan.

## **13.0 CORONER'S OFFICE FUNCTION**

### **Overview**

- 13.1 The role of the Coroner's Office is to represent the interests of Her Majesty's Coroner and Bedfordshire Police in the investigation of sudden, violent, suspicious or unnatural deaths. The principal clients for the service within the Force are Senior Investigating Officers (SIOs), the Collision Investigation Unit, territorial divisions and the Professional Standards Unit.
- 13.2 The Coroner's Officer service is managed by a Police Sergeant who leads a team of four staff. Three of these staff are Bedfordshire Police employees and one a County Council employee. The Coroner's Officers work out of two premises located in Bedford and Luton with each office serving its respective part of the Force area. Total service costs are spread between Bedfordshire County Council, Luton Borough Council and Bedfordshire Police. Under these arrangements, the Force is reimbursed for the main staffing costs it incurs.
- 13.3 Comparisons made with other forces revealed that the funding and staffing of the Coroner's Officer function have developed differently in different force areas. For example, in Warwickshire, the Coroner's function forms a part of the County Council structure where as in Leicestershire the position is similar to Bedfordshire in that the Police and Local Authorities jointly fund the service.

### **Service Provision**

- 13.4 The main functions of the Coroner's Officer service are to attend the scene of all sudden deaths, arrange post mortem examinations, attend inquests and to handle all appropriate legal documentation for deaths reportable to the Coroner. The provision of information, advice and support to bereaved families is also central to the role.
- 13.5 The Coroner's Officers provide a 24-hour call-out system to support major incident investigations. Internal consultation showed that this call-out system was highly regarded by Senior Investigating Officers who also praised the professionalism of the service overall.

- 13.6 During 2002/03, the Coroner's Office dealt with 1,989 deaths, 960 of which required a post mortem and 220 of which involved an inquest. Coroner's Officers attended and dealt with 314 deaths and the police attended and dealt with 774 deaths.
- 13.7 Service standards have been in operations since 1997 and measure the time taken to complete legal documentation relating to the release of a body following a report to the Coroner. A standard of 95% compliance with time scales operates for a range of different circumstances. Performance exceeded all standards during 2002/03.

### **National Developments**

- 13.8 In July 2001, the Home Secretary established a review group to consider the future of the coroner's service. The group's findings were published in June 2003 in a report entitled, *The Fundamental Review of Death Certification and Coroner Services*. In addition to proposing a number of changes to procedures for death certification, one key recommendation was to move away from Local Authority service provision by establishing a National Coroners' Service operating as part of the Lord Chancellors Department.
- 13.9 Following publication of the report, the Home Office established a Coroner Reform Group to consider and take forward recommendations. Legislation would be required to enact the proposed changes; the indicative date for this legislation is 2005 with possible implementation during 2006.
- 13.10 In July 2003, Dame Janet Smith published three reports relating to the Shipman Inquiry:
- *Death Disguised* - a consideration of how many people Shipman killed;
  - *The Police Investigation of March 1998* - why this investigation failed to uncover Shipman's crimes;
  - *Death and Cremation Certification* - a consideration of the present systems for death and cremation certification and for the investigation of deaths by coroners.
- 13.11 Included in these three reports were a number of recommendations concerning the operation of systems relating to the work of Coroners. Although some immediate changes to working practices have been introduced as a result of the Shipman Inquiry, the Home Office is still considering other recommendations.

## **Potential Impact of Creating a National Coroners Service**

- 13.12 Although firm proposals have yet to emerge regarding the notion of creating a National Coroners Service, the Force should be actively considering the implications of such a change on local service provision in Bedfordshire. In particular, the potential impact on staff employed in providing this service need to be assessed.

## **Key Recommendations**

- 13.13 This Review has identified no recommendations of a strategic nature relating to the operation of the Coroner's Office function.

## **Management Action Recommendations**

- 13.14 The Q Division Management Team should undertake an evaluation of the impact that the creation of a National Coroners Service would have on local service provision in Bedfordshire, including the impact on existing staff, staffing levels and service costs.

## **14.0 FIREARMS LICENSING FUNCTION**

### **Overview**

- 14.1 The Firearms Licensing Section is responsible for managing and administering all firearms licensing matters within the Force. This includes new applications, renewals and making home visits. The Home Office and ACPO have both published guidelines and procedural good practice guidance regarding the Firearms Licensing, which the Force has adopted.
- 14.2 Firearms Licensing operates on a five-year cycle with renewals taking place over a specified three years period, with the remaining two years intended to address qualitative issues associated with the licensing process. The five-year cycle then begins again. New applications and changes to details are dealt with on an on-going basis.
- 14.3 The Firearms Licensing Section consists of a total of four staff – a Licensing Manager and three Firearms Enquiry Officers. During the peak period of license renewals, two additional Firearms Enquiry Officers are employed on short-term contracts. The Section had been successful in maintaining its record of undertaking 100% of the recommended home visits.

### **Alignment within the Structure of the Force Intelligence Bureau**

- 14.4 Following the internal management review of the Community Action Department, the decision was taken to incorporate the operation of the Firearms Licensing Section within the structure of the Force Intelligence Bureau. The primary rationale for this change was to emphasise the increasing importance of the intelligence held by the Section and to ensure that such information was routinely available and considered along side other sources of intelligence.
- 14.5 Internal consultation undertaken for this review showed that this realignment with the intelligence arm of the Force was supported and that additional benefits would be derived once the National Firearms Licensing Management System is implemented in August 2004. It was also felt that alignment with the FIB might provide for more resilience in terms of staffing and support for the Section.

- 14.6 Preparatory work for the implementation of the national system is well underway, building on the work undertaken during 2002 to review existing databases. Once implemented, this new system will remove the need to maintain paper records and will also provide online access to data concerning all firearm licenses held in the UK.

### **HMIC Thematic Inspection of Firearms Licensing**

- 14.7 During 2002, the HMIC conducted a thematic inspection into Firearms Licensing. This inspection was designed to assess the progress achieved in implementing the recommendations made by Lord Cullen following the 1996 Dunblane shootings.
- 14.8 A paper setting out Bedfordshire's position in relation to the 10 main recommendations made by the HMIC was prepared and presented to the Police Authority. An action plan to progress management actions within Q Division was also developed.

### **Key Recommendations**

- 14.9 This Review has identified no recommendations of a strategic nature relating to the operation of the Firearms Licensing Section.


### **Management Action Recommendations**

- 14.10 This Review has identified no recommendations for management action relating to the operation of the Firearms Licensing Section (other than those already being progressed through the action plan developed in response to the HMIC thematic Inspection).

**15.0 ORGANISATION & MANAGEMENT OF THE SPECIALIST CRIME SERVICES DIVISION**

15.1 The Specialist Crime Services Division (Q Division) is responsible for the delivery of a very broad range of policing functions, each of which is a specialist area in its own right. These functions are undertaken from a variety of geographical locations across the force area.

15.2 Led by a Detective Chief Superintendent, the senior management structure of Q Division is shown in **Figure 17** below:



**Co-ordinating Services and Common Purpose**

15.3 One of the key challenges for Q Division’s Management Team (DMT) is to develop a sense of common purpose that links these individual services, while simultaneously taking account of national drivers which directly influence activity in some areas (e.g. Special Branch or Criminal Justice Department).

15.4 The DMT recognise the need to develop this sense of common purpose and have introduced a number of initiatives. These include:

- defining a set of divisional objectives;
- developing a common approach to annual service planning across all functions of the Division;
- introducing a divisional newsletter and putting information on the divisional home Intranet web page;
- regular 'away-day' sessions with functional managers to discuss performance, problems and planned developments.

15.5 Feedback received from managers on territorial divisions highlighted that, under the leadership of the current divisional commander, there has been an ongoing improvement in working relationships and Q Division as a whole was now much more customer focused.

### **The Impact of Senior Investigating Officer Responsibilities**

15.6 In terms of the way in which Q Division functions on a day-to-day basis, the key area of weaknesses highlighted during the internal consultation phase of this review was the problems created when line managers are abstracted from their roles to perform Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) duties on major incidents.

15.7 This has been a very real issue during the last 2 to 3 years given that two of the division's senior managers are SIOs and that the divisional commander also carries a responsibility in the Force's SIO duty rota. The problems created by SIO abstractions include:

- (i) difficulties in sustaining the collective work of the Divisional Management Team (the DMT had only met on 3 or 4 occasions during the preceding twelve months);
- (ii) an ongoing long-hours culture for the SIOs who do their best in trying to perform both their line management and investigatory roles but who acknowledge that the line management role ends up being given a lesser priority;
- (iii) difficulties in sustaining effective communication and day-to-day decision-making – internal consultation revealed that a number of functional managers had very little contact with their line manager and that decision-making was often disrupted during a major incident.

## **Actions to Improve Management Resilience**

15.8 During the course of this review, the Force Executive has taken a number of actions to try and improve the resilience of Q Division's management team and to tackle the problem of SIO resilience. These actions have included:

- (i) Designating a third Senior Investigating Officer Superintendent post for the Force (within the management team of Luton Division rather than as a part of Q Division) to increase resilience for the SIO function;
- (ii) Appointing a Senior Scientific Services Manager to act as professional head of the whole Department and who sits as a member of the Divisional Management Team (previously line management responsibility for the Department was through one of the SIO Superintendent posts);
- (iii) Appointing a Detective Chief Inspector as head of the Force Intelligence Bureau and to act as Deputy Director on Intelligence (this should ensure more continuity in the operation of NIM Level 2 activity during those periods when the Director of Intelligence is abstracted to SIO duties);
- (iv) Appointing a Superintendent to lead the work of the Criminal Justice Department (introduced as a result of the internal management review of the Community Action Department, this change is designed to reflect the increased national focus on criminal justice matters).

15.9 A number of these changes have only recently been introduced and so it is not yet possible to determine whether they will be sufficient to address the identified problems. Given this background it is suggested that the Force Executive re-examine the issue before the end of the 2004/05 financial year.

## **Human Resource Management**

15.10 As a division with over 200 members of staff and with many staff performing roles that create a particular need in terms of welfare support, it is somewhat surprising that the division does not have a dedicated Personnel Officer.

- 15.11 Currently the division's human resources functions are performed through a combination of line management, DMT member involvement and the work of the Administration Services Manager. One particular issue raised by a number of line managers during internal consultation process was that, due to the specialist nature of the roles performed within the division, there was an ongoing workload created by recruitment and selection activity.
- 15.12 Given the problems previously highlighted in terms of the lack of management resilience within the division and the impact caused by SIO abstractions, an number of examples were highlighted during consultation concerning human resource decisions being delayed and of identified training needs not being effectively progressed.
- 15.13 The review process also highlighted the fact that the division did not have an effective process to monitor changes in workload across its various functions and to review its disposition of staff accordingly.
- 15.14 Given this overall background, it is the conclusion of this review that there is sufficient prima-facie evidence to merit the development of a business case for a dedicated Personnel Officer serving Q Division.

### **Key Recommendations**

- 15.15 This Review has identified no recommendations of a strategic nature relating to the operation of the management structure of the Specialist Crime Services Division (other than those already being addressed through recent changes made to management team roles and responsibilities).

### **Management Action Recommendations**

- 15.16 The Force Executive should re-examine the issue of management resilience within Q Division in order to determine whether recently introduced changes have alleviated the identified problems. This re-examination should take place prior to the end of the 2004/05 financial year.
- 15.17 The Q Division Management Team should seek to appoint a dedicated Personnel Officer to provide professional HR support to the division.

## 16.0 CONCLUSIONS

16.0 This best value review has sought to provide a strategic examination of Bedfordshire's specialist crime support services. The review has been undertaken in the context of a number of key organisational drivers. As a result of this examination, five areas of strength and four areas of weakness have been identified. Recommendations for change have been developed to address each of the identified areas of weakness.

### **Areas of Strength**

16.1 The best value process inevitably tends to focus on area of weaknesses and opportunities for improvement. However, in order to provide for a fair and balanced reflection of the state of specialist crime service, strengths should also be highlighted. This review has identified five main areas of strength:

- (i) The Force is extremely professional and thorough in its approach to the investigation of major crime;
- (ii) The Force has some extremely highly skilled, effective and flexible specialist units who have produced notable and high profile successes;
- (iii) The Force has been at the leading edge in terms of the application of Fingerprint identification technologies and Fingerprint Bureau is consistently ranked an one of the top five performers in England and Wales;
- (iv) The culture of Q Division includes a clear willingness to develop and improve services in support of frontline policing;
- (v) In line with the Force's commitment to full implementation of the National Intelligence Model, Q Division is changing the way in which it operates and developing its capability in key areas such as intelligence analysis.

### **Areas of Weakness**

16.2 This review has identified a number of instances where specialist crime support functions are currently under-resourced and consequently are having a detrimental impact on the overall effectiveness of the Force. The review has identified four key areas where improvements need to be made:

**(i) The support given to major incident investigations:**

The volume of major incidents, combined with the ongoing need to abstract staff from their core roles to resource them, is having an ongoing impact on the performance of both frontline and specialist policing functions.

This review has identified opportunities to reduce abstraction levels and improve efficiency by establishing a permanent team of HOLMES Indexers.

**(ii) The capability to deal with serious and cross-border crime issues:**

The Force is committed to the NIM approach but as yet it has not invested sufficient resources to enable it to fully apply the approach to Level 2 criminality. Although this problem reflects a similar trend across forces in England and Wales, this review has nonetheless identified two areas where Level 2 capacity needs to be improved:

- Increasing the ability to develop intelligence packages on NIM Level 2 target criminals by increasing the number of Field Intelligence Officers;
- Increasing the ability to sustain surveillance and other targeted operations against NIM Level 2 targets by increasing the resources of the Drug Squad.

**(iii) The forensic examination of crime scenes:**

Building on work undertaken by the Policing Standards Unit, the Force is already part way through a major change programme designed to improve forensic outcomes and overall scientific services performance. However, capacity still needs to be increased further in order to obtain best value from the forensic examination of crime scenes – this requires more Scenes of Crime Officers.

**(iv) The investigation of volume fraud offences and use of POCA powers**

Cheque and plastic card crimes make up the vast majority of reported fraud offences. This review has identified opportunities to remove workload from frontline officers in relation to these types of offences and to improve overall performance in terms of offences detected.

END

## 17.0 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Functional Area	Recommendation	Issues for Management Action
<b>Major Incident Unit</b>	<b>The Force should create a permanent HOLMES team capacity to support the investigation of major incidents by appointing ten police staff HOLMES Indexers.</b>	The Q Division Management Team should identify a post holder to act as a second Family Liaison Officer Co-ordinator and ensure that both Family Liaison Officer Co-ordinators undertake a suitable FLO training course.
		The Q Division Management Team should ensure that the Head of the MIU and one other nominated post-holder undertake the Casualty Bureau training course.
		The Q Division Management Team should ensure that, prior to the end of the 2004/05 financial year, an exercise to test the Force's Casualty Bureau plan is conducted.
		The Q Division Management Team should develop a business case setting out the costs and benefits for establishing permanent Disclosure/Exhibits Officer posts to support major incident investigations (these posts could be police officer or police staff roles).
<b>Drugs Squad &amp; Surveillance Capability</b>	<b>The Force should retain its current approach of operating with a centrally based team of specialist officers performing a multi-functional role in relation to drug-related crime, surveillance and major incident investigations. However, the Drug Squad should be re-titled as the Drug and Serious Crime Group to better reflect its role in dealing with NIM Level 2 criminality.</b>	The Q Division Management Team should develop a protocol to show how the resources of the expanded Drug and Serious Crime Group will be used as investigators to support various categories of major incidents.
	<b>The Force should expand the operational capacity of the Drug and Serious Crime Group by increasing the number of constable posts by nine, thereby giving 25 centrally-based operational constable posts in total</b>  <b>(Note: these additional posts would be provided from police posts released as a result of the Force's 2004/05 civilianisation programme and not through police establishment growth).</b>	The Q Division Management Team should develop a process to utilise the specialist skills of the Drug and Serious Crime Group in liaising with and supporting officers on territorial divisions in dealing with drug offences; this might include introducing Drug Liaison Officers.
	The Q Division Management Team should examine the potential benefits of civilianising the Chemist Inspection Officer post and of incorporating that function within the Community Action Department, working alongside the Force Drugs Co-ordinator.	
The line management responsibility for the Technical Support Unit be transferred from the Force Intelligence Bureau and be incorporated within the structure of the Drug and Serious Crime Group.		

**SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS CONTINUED**

Functional Area	Recommendation	Issues for Management Action
<b>Fraud Squad</b>	<p><b>The Cheque and Plastic Card Unit should undertake both an intelligence gathering and offender-handling role. In order to provide this extended level of service, the resources of the Unit should be increased by four constable posts</b></p> <p><b>(Note:</b> these additional posts would be provided from police posts released as a result of the Force's 2004/05 civilianisation programme and not through police establishment growth).</p>	<p>The Q Division Management Team should rename the Fraud Squad as the Economic Crime Unit in order to reflect better its full range of responsibilities and to emphasise the increased focus on cheque and plastic card offences, and the application of POCA powers.</p> <p>The Q Division Management Team should make suitable budgetary provision for buying-in specialist fraud investigation skills to cover the period until the Force has a full establishment of trained fraud investigators.</p>
	<p><b>The Force should re-focus its financial investigation processes to give more emphasis to reactive investigations arising from arrests/convictions and so maximise opportunities presented by the Proceeds of Crime Act.</b></p>	<p>The Q Division Management Team should develop a business case setting out the costs and benefits of expanding the Force's financial investigation capacity so as to potentially provide a suitably trained member of staff (police officer or police staff) in the Intelligence Unit on each of the territorial Divisions.</p>
	<b>Scientific Services Department</b>	<p><b>The Force should further develop its forensic science capability by increasing the number of SOCO posts from the current level of 24 up to 28 posts.</b></p>
<b>Force Intelligence Bureau</b>	<p><b>The Force should increase its capacity to deal with NIM Level 2 criminality by creating three additional constable Field Intelligence Officer posts in the Force Intelligence Bureau.</b></p> <p><b>(Note:</b> these additional posts would be provided from police posts released as a result of the Force's 2004/05 civilianisation programme and not through police establishment growth).</p>	<p>The Q Division Management Team should align the responsibilities in individual Field Intelligence Officers with the five priorities in the NIM Level 2 Control Strategy.</p>

**SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS CONTINUED**

Functional Area	Recommendation	Issues for Management Action
<b>Criminal Justice Department</b>	<b>None.</b>	The Q Division Management Team should improve the access to criminal justice related information for operational officers. This should include exploring the feasibility of utilising the Force Intranet to create a one-stop-shop for all relevant information.
		The Q Division Management Team should liaise with the Bedfordshire Local Criminal Justice Board (Criminal Justice Excellence Forum subgroup) to ensure a common format of DVD based video imagery display equipment is in operation at all Courts in the Force area.
<b>Child Protection Team</b>	<b>None.</b>	The Q Division Management Team should conduct a post-implementation evaluation of the operation of the SSOT, including the impact on the role and workload of DVLOs. This evaluation should take place after the SSOT has been in operation for 12 months.
<b>Community Action Dept</b>	<b>None.</b>	None
<b>Coroner's Office</b>	<b>None.</b>	The Q Division Management Team should undertake an evaluation of the impact that the creation of a National Coroners Service would have on local service provision in Bedfordshire, including the impact on existing staff, staffing levels and service costs.
<b>Firearms Licensing.</b>	<b>None.</b>	None.
<b>Organisation &amp; Management of Q Division</b>	<b>None.</b>	The Force Executive should re-examine the issue of management resilience within Q Division in order to determine whether recently introduced changes have alleviated the identified problems. This re-examination should take place prior to the end of the 2004/05 financial year.
		The Q Division Management Team should seek to appoint a dedicated Personnel Officer to provide professional HR support to the Specialist Crime Services Division.

## 18.0 SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Recommendation	Capital Cost £000	Revenue cost (contained in 2004/5 budget) £000	Revenue cost (requiring future budget growth) £000	Saving			Total savings (costs)	Notes
				Cashable	Non-cashable	Potential Efficiency Gain#		
Create a permanent HOLMES team capacity to support the investigation of major incidents by appointing ten police staff HOLMES Indexers.	Nil	184	Nil	Nil	348	Nil	164	Revenue costs based on 10 police staff posts at Grade 4.
Expand the operational capacity of the Drug and Serious Crime Group by increasing the number of constable posts by nine, thereby giving 25 centrally based operational constable posts in total.	Nil	324*	Nil	Nil	Nil	410#	86	*Additional posts to be provided by redistribution of the existing Force establishment rather than through budget growth.
The Cheque and Plastic Unit should undertake both an intelligence gathering and offender-handling role. In order to provide this extended level of service, four constable posts should increase the resources of the Unit.	Nil	144*	Nil	Nil	Nil	135#	(9)	*Additional posts to be provided by redistribution of the existing Force establishment rather than through budget growth.
Develop forensic science capability by increasing the number of SOCO posts from the current level of 24 up to 28 posts.	Nil	89	Nil	Nil	Nil	290#	201	Revenue costs based on 4 police staff posts at Grades 3 to 6.
Increase the capacity to deal with NIM Level 2 criminality by creating three additional constable Field Intelligence Officer posts in the Force Intelligence Bureau.	Nil	108*	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	(108)	*Additional posts to be provided by redistribution of the existing Force establishment rather than through budget growth.
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>Nil</b>	<b>885</b>	<b>Nil</b>	<b>Nil</b>	<b>348</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>342</b>	

\* Cost of internally redistributing police posts represents an opportunity cost of not deploying posts to frontline policing roles

# Potential efficiency gains based on the percentage increase in capacity of functions relative to their total cost

## Summary of 4Cs Activity

### One-to One 'Challenge' Meetings Held with:

Deputy Chief Constable	Detective Inspector (Child Protection Team)
Assistant Chief Constable	Detective Inspector (Force Drug Squad)
Detective Chief Superintendent (Head of Specialist Crime Services Division)	Detective Sergeant (Major Incident Team)
Chief Superintendent (Head of Operational Support Division)	Detective Sergeant (Fraud Squad)
Chief Superintendent (North Bedfordshire Division)	Detective Sergeant (Force Drug Squad)
Chief Superintendent (Central Bedfordshire Division)	Detective Sergeant (Force Intelligence Bureau)
Chief Superintendent (Luton Division)	Detective Sergeant (Sensitive Policing Unit)
Detective Superintendent (Senior Investigating Officer)	Detective Constable (High Tech Crime Unit)
Superintendent (Community Action Department)	Detective Constable (Computer Forensics)
Chief Inspector (Criminal Justice Department)	Detective Constable (Force Intelligence Bureau)
Inspector (Criminal Justice Department)	Police Staff Manager (Head of Fingerprint Bureau)
Detective Inspector (Force Intelligence Bureau)	Police Staff Manager (Head of Scenes of Crime Section)
	Police Staff Manager (Head of Photographic Section)

### Focus Groups with Service Users and Service Providers

North Bedfordshire Division Service Users Group - Attended by 4 Police Officers and 3 Police Staff	Fraud Focus Group - Attended by 3 Police Officers and 2 Police Staff
Central Bedfordshire Division Service Users Group - Attended by 5 Police Officers	Drugs Focus Group - Attended by 5 Police Officers and 1 Police Staff
Luton Division Service Users Group - Attended by 7 Police Officers and 2 Police Staff	Surveillance Group - Attended by 9 Police Officers
Operational Support Division Service Users Group - Attended by 5 Police Officers	Major Incident Group - Attended by 3 Police Officers and 1 Police Staff
	Specialist Crime Services Managers Group - Attended by 7 Police Officers and 1 Police Staff

**A total of 9 Focus Groups involving some 48 Police Officers and 20 Police Staff**

### Comparison Visits Made to:

- Leicestershire Constabulary
- Warwickshire Police

### External Challenge Provided by:

- Bedford Borough Council

## Financial Overview of the Specialist Crime Services Division (2002/03 Actual Spend)

Area of Activity	£
<b>Staffing Costs</b>	<b>5,930,000</b>
Police Officer Pay and Associated Costs	3,988,000
Police Staff Pay and Associated Costs	1,942,000
<b>Agency Costs</b>	<b>1,547,000</b>
Forensic Science	832,000
DNA Testing	680,000
Pathology Services	35,000
<b>Transport Costs</b>	<b>392,000</b>
<b>Supplies &amp; Services</b>	<b>405,000</b>
Including:	
- Scientific Support	122,000
- Doctors Fees	71,000
- Charges for Phone Tracing	25,000
<b>Income, Fees &amp; Reimbursements</b>	<b>(745,000)</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>7,530,000</b>

## Staffing Disposition Profile for the Specialist Crime Services Division (at May 2003)

Function/Area	Established Police Posts	No. of Officers at 1 <sup>st</sup> May 2003	Established Police Staff Posts	No. of Police Staff at 1 <sup>st</sup> May 2003
- Command	6	5	0	0
- Drug Squad	19	16	1	1
- Fraud	8	8	2.5	2
- Special Branch	25	18	2	2
- Force Intelligence Bureau	14	11	10	7
- Dedicated Source Handling Unit	6	1	1	0
- Family Protection Team	22	22	1	1
- Scientific Services	10	8	52.5	47.5
- Community Action Department	3	4	5	4
- Police National Computer Bureau	1	3	11	9.5
- Criminal Justice Department	4	2	5	4
- Support & Administration	2	2	10	11
- Other	2	1	1	0
<b>Total for Specialist Crime Support</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>89</b>